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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wilson’s famous quote that “Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work”
(1885, 69) has been used countless times to emphasize the importance of committees
in the legislative process. While scholars—to this day—generally accept Wilson’s
description of committees as the locus of legislative action, they are largely divided
in their views of what the committees do, how they do it, and why.1 Undoubtedly,
committees serve to more efficiently process the legislative agenda, but as Wilson
noted they certainly also “represent something more than a mere convenient division
of labor (1885, 68).” Scholars have variously argued that committees facilitate a sys-
tem of logrolls and vote trading (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Shepsle and Weingast
1995) or provide a source of policy-specific information for the chamber (Gilligan and
Krehbiel 1990). Yet, one of the most important insights regarding committees is their
crucial role in advancing policy agendas in the chamber (Cox and McCubbins 1993,
1The debates among the advocates of the various theories of legislative organization all, at least
tangentially, relate to the role of the committee system (Groseclose and King 2001).
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2005). In the U.S. House, committees have gatekeeping powers that grant commit-
tee chairs negative agenda control, through the ability to let bills die in committee.
Therefore, committees play an important role in determining which legislation will
be considered and, thus, in shaping the political agenda of the legislature.
While, in many contexts, legislative committees do appear to give procedural con-
trol over what proposals will be heard and when (e.g., Cox and McCubbins, 2005;
Anzia and Jackman, 2012), committee systems are, also themselves, reflective of a
more general agenda. Committees are created in order to deal with issues important
to legislatures or constituents, and the committee system itself is a statement of pri-
orities, where members establish committees to deal with certain issues, while not
establishing them for others. While the polity might have some semblance of a policy
agenda, this is simply an aggregation of individual citizens’ personal priorities shaped
by their experiences, identities, environments, etc. Legislators are no different; they
arrive in the chamber with their own policy interests and priorities. With these par-
ticularized individual agendas, each member has an array of committee assignments
that they will perceive to be the most beneficial to their goals, given the issues they
want to engage in. Thus, as Bullock (1972) remarks: “With committees... beauty is
often in the eye of the beholder” (997). Whether or not they receive these assignments
is a function of various factors, including who assigns committees, the way they are
assigned, the member’s willingness or ability to request those beneficial assignments,
and the willingness of leadership to accommodate those requests.2
The committee assignment process, therefore, plays a significant role in deter-
2From here on rank-and-file members will simply be referred to as members, who are distinct
from leaders. In the context of this project, leaders are always those members who have formal
input into distributing assignments.
2
mining if members will receive assignments to those committees conducive to their
personal agendas. The literature on legislative committee assignments emphasizes two
important points of interest to us. First, in the pursuit of committee assignments,
rank-and-file members are largely motivated by policy interests, whether originat-
ing from personal or constituent concerns (Masters 1961, Fenno 1973, Bullock 1976;
Smith and Deering 1983, 1997). Second, party leadership tends to accommodate
member requests in assigning committees (Westfiled 1974; Gertzog 1976; Shepsle
1978; Smith & Ray 1983, Francis 1985, 1989; Smith & Deering 1997). These two in-
sights taken together imply that the array of policy committee assignments a member
receives should be generally reflective of her policy agenda. Fenno describes this as a
“matching process,” where individual legislators match their “patterns of aspiration
to the diverse patterns of opportunity” presented by the committee system (Fenno
1973 pp. 1-2).3 It has often been assumed that this matching is important for the
proper functioning of legislative bodies, as members with committee assignments that
match their interests should be more involved in their committees, integrated into the
chamber, and able to develop and apply policy expertise (Gertzog 1976; Bullock 1985;
Krehbiel 1991).
While at the national-level many of the crucial institutional factors that contribute
to the matching of committee assignments with policy interests stay relatively fixed,
3Some readers may find this concept of “matching” to closely parallel that measured by a small
field of work attempting to ascertain the value of specific committee assignments (Bullock and
Sprague 1969; Munger 1988; Grosclose and Steward 1998, 1999). While the concept of “value”
is certainly related to the concept of “matching” articulated by Fenno, in the existing literature
“value” has consistently been defined more as the average popularity of a particular committee
by using committee transfers to determine which committees legislators tend to favor over others.
This operationalization of “value” eschews any consideration of the particularized and differentiated
needs of members. For this reason, I prefer to use Fenno’s language of “matching,” as it makes the
subjective nature of committee value more explicit.
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in the state legislatures, we find a significant amount of variation on these same
factors. Specifically, the variety of committee system structures and assignment pro-
cesses found in the states presents different opportunities for legislators to match
their policy interests with their assignments. Although a good amount of scholarship
has examined the contours of state legislative committee systems (e.g., Battista 2006,
2009; Francis 1989; Hamm 1980, 1982, 1983; Hamm, Hedlund and Materano 2006;
Overby and Kazee 2000; Overby, Kazee, and Prince 2004), to my knowledge, none
have considered the nexus of assignments and individual policy agendas. Previous
work on Congress and in the states has focused on the strategic process by which
legislators receive their standing committee assignments, outlining the determinants
of member assignment requests (Fenno 1973; Bullock 1976; Smith and Deering 1983)
and the accommodation of those requests by the party leadership (Westefield 1974;
Gertzog 1976; Shepsle 1978). This branch of research has primarily been concerned
with understanding how legislators (both members and leadership) use committee as-
signments to achieve specific goals. Although this project draws heavily from existing
literature on committee assignments, I depart from their traditional line of inquiry by
shifting the focus away from member requests for committee assignments to actual,
demonstrated legislative policy interests. In doing so, the research question becomes
about how well committee assignments match members’ legislative activity and the
causes and consequences of this match.
4
1.1 What We Know About Committee Assignments
The match between member agendas and committee assignments is a function of the
requesting behavior of members and the accommodation behavior of the leadership.
By a member’s policy agenda, I am referring to a collection of policy issues that the
member sees as being of particular concern, given their context. What is important
here is that an agenda is comprised of issues and not issue positions (Klingdon 1983;
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sulkin 2011) and that individual member’s agendas
can vary by context and perception. For a good match, members need to request
those committee assignments in line with their policy agenda, and leadership has to
accommodate these requests as much as possible. Therefore, the match is the result of
multiple actors (at least two) facing various incentives, limitations, and motivations.
Furthermore, the assignment process follows a predictable sequence, where members
identify those committees on which they would like to serve first, and then relay those
requests to the assignment authority. Those in charge of assignments then assess all
of the requests and distribute assignments based on the rules of the chamber. Figure
1.1 provides a graphic representation of the basic model of committee assignments.
From Figure 1.1 we see that the process begins with the individual member’s
agenda. Based on this agenda, the member formulates a request for assignments that
she finds optimal. This request is then communicated to the leadership (assignment
authority). The leadership then compiles requests from all members and devises a
set of assignments, with a general impetus to accommodate requests as much as pos-
sible. The degree to which the resulting assignments align with the original member
agendas constitutes the degree of the committee-agenda matching for that member.
In the case where each arrow in Figure 1.1 perfectly translates the input from the
5
Figure 1.1: A Basic Model of Committee Assignments
previous stage to the subsequent one, we would expect perfect matches for all mem-
bers. However, as we will discuss below, there are several institutional barriers and
individual considerations that frequently undermine this kind of perfect translation.
While there is variation across legislatures in the exact means by which this process
unfolds, the model in Figure 1.1 is sufficiently broad and inclusive to accommodate
virtually all assignment processes in the American context.4 In the U.S. House of
Representatives, the process occurs for each of the two major parties independently.
The shares of assignments for each party tend to approximate the relative sizes of
the parties in the parent chamber. Both parties have a good amount of discretion in
determining how to distribute their share of assignments, yet they both follow very
similar methods. Both rely on special committees, made up primarily of party leader-
ship, to distribute assignments to their respective caucuses. Members make requests
4The only assignment process I have encountered that does not fit the model in Figure 1.1 comes
from Arkansas, where a seniority-weighted randomized method is used. Various rigid requirements,
including approval from House District caucuses, in the Arkansas rules eliminate most of the space
for leadership discretion in the process. See Broockman and Butler (2015) for a full description of
the process in Arkansas.
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to their party’s committee, which are taken into consideration. Both parties also
utilize seniority and committee property rights5 to favor some members over others.
The committees then make recommendations for assignments that are then voted on
by the party caucuses. Once the caucuses approve each parties’ recommendations, a
resolution of the combined assignments is then voted on by the full chamber.
Although there are elements to the U.S House assignment process not explicitly
outlined in the model in Figure 1.1, the general sequences and actors are consistent.
In the vast number of American state lower chambers, we find processes that also
conform to this model. In fact, the state chambers tend to have more simplified
assignment processes that fit even more smoothly with this basic model. Table 1.1
shows with whom the assignment authority rests in all 49 state lower chambers for
2011.
What we find in the vast majority of states is that, unlike in the U.S. House, com-
mittee assignment authority tends to be consolidated in the hands of the Speaker.
In 41 states, the Speaker has the ultimate and complete authority over assigning
majority party members to standing committees. Additionally, in two states, while
the Speaker is the assignment authority, her power is limited in the rules. In North
Dakota, a majority vote of the whole chamber is required to confirm the assignments
proposed by the Speaker. While in Texas, half of all assignments are alloted by a
seniority system, with the others are filled by the Speaker. Of these 43 states that
grant the Speaker significant, if not complete, authority over majority party com-
mittee assignments, 36 also give the Speaker complete authority over minority party
assignments. Twelve of these 36 do allow the minority party leader to consult on
5Committee property rights refers to a phenomenon where sitting members of a committee are
very rarely ousted from their seat against their wishes.
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Table 1.1: Committee Assignment Authority in the 49 State Lower
Chambers: 2011
Majority Party Assignment Authority
Speaker
AL AZ CA CT DE FL GA IA IN KS LA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT NC
NDa NH NJ NM NY OH OK OR RI SC SD TN TXc VA VT WI WV WY
Committee AK
a KY PAa
Party Caucus HI
a WA
Otherd AR
c
Minority Party Assignment Authority
Speaker
AL AZb CAb CT DE FL GA IAb INb KSb LA MD ME MIb MO MS MT NC
NDab NHb NJb NM NYb OH OK OR RIb SC SD TN TXc VA VT WIb WV
WY
Minority Leader CO ID IL MA MN NV UT
a
Committee AK
ab KY PAa
Party Caucus HI
a WA
Otherd AR
c
Sources: Book of the States, Inside the Legislative Process (NCSL), Anzia and Jackman (2015), and
specific chamber rules obtained via legislative websites.
aAssignments require majority vote for approval.
bMinority Leaders consult on minority appointments.
cArkansas and Texas also have formal seniority systems.
dIn Arkansas, members select committees based on tenure, where those with equal tenure are assigned
random orders. Additionally, there are strict requirements for geographical representations based on the
state’s U.S. House Districts.
minority party assignments, but there is no requirement in the rules that the Speaker
acquiesce to their recommendations. The seven remaining states where the Speaker
assigns the majority grant the minority leader the authority to assign minority mem-
bers.
The six remaining states from table 1.1 have less centralized assignment author-
ities. There are three states (Alaska, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania) that use a com-
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mittee on committees to make assignments. Additionally, in both Alaska and Penn-
sylvania, the recommendations of the committee on committees must be approved
by a majority vote of the entire chamber. In Hawaii and Washington, the party cau-
cuses determine how the committee membership will be assigned, with Hawaii also
requiring majority approval from the chamber. Finally, Arkansas utilizes a tenure
based system that also requires balancing geographic representation based on U.S.
House districts (see Broockman and Butler 2015 for a more thorough account of the
process).
What is striking about table 1.1 is the degree to which the states tend not to re-
semble the U.S House. In the majority of cases (36), committee assignment authority
is consolidated in the Speaker, with very little formal access to the process by other
members. Yet, there is also variation across states, with seven states that consolidate
authority in the two individuals making up the party leaderships, two chambers ap-
proximating the process in the U.S. House (Alaska and Pennsylvania), and another
three that may decentralize this authority to an even greater extent than we find in
Washington D.C.
It is important to note that while each of these different processes that we find in
the states might alter the actors outlined in Figure 1.1, the basic nature and sequence
of the process holds across these differences. It is always true that members make their
preferences for committees known to the assignment authority prior to assignment and
that the authority subsequently aggregates these across members and uses them, to
varying degrees, as the initial input for the complete array of assignments. Therefore,
the process by which members formulate their requests and the degree to which the
assignment authority accommodates member requests are the crucial moving parts
9
in determining the match between member agendas and committee assignments.
In what follows, I will take up the task of outlining what the political science lit-
erature has to say about how members formulate their assignment requests and if the
assignment authority tends to accommodate those requests. I argue that the existing
research provides good support for the contention that requests tend to reflect mem-
ber policy interests and that assignment authorities are prone, to varying degrees, to
accommodate those requests. The degree to which these two processes unfold as the-
orized, ultimately determines the degree to which a member’s committee assignments
will match her policy agenda. I begin by reviewing the evidence for leadership accom-
modation across various legislative contexts. After I have shown that accommodation
is a common assignment strategy, I then turn to member motivations for pursuing
committee assignments and show that policy interests dominate. Although the formu-
lation of member requests takes temporal precedence to leadership accommodation,
I choose to address accommodation first because of the extensive literature on the
subject and the degree to which it will inform the outline of member motivations for
requests.
1.1.1 Leadership Accommodation of Committee Assignments
I argue that the leadership uses member requests as an initial input in devising a
system of chamber-wide committee assignments. In the literature on legislative com-
mittees, this is usually referred to as leadership accommodation. This observed phe-
nomenon can be summarized by Westfield’s (1974) early claim that “leaders attempt
to accommodate member demands for committee positions (1593)” (e.g., Westefield
1974; Gertzog 1976; Shepsle 1978; Smith & Ray 1983, Francis 1985 1989; Hedlund
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1989; Smith & Deering 1997). Under this theory, freshman members advertise their
committee assignment preferences, and the party leadership employs a strategy of
accommodation, in order to maintain “compliant behavior” from their membership
and promote party unity (Westefield 1974, 1594). For the theorists advancing this
proposition, accommodation often motivates leaders to expand committee sizes to sat-
isfy demand for assignments on popular committees (Westefield 1974; Shepsle 1978).
For our purposes, however, we are interested in what accommodation means for the
translation of member requests into committee assignments.
Leadership accommodation is the final process in translating member agendas to
committee assignments, where if the accommodation is perfect, we expect members
to receive all of their requested assignments and for the match between agendas and
assignments to be closer than if requests were accommodated to a lesser degree or
not at all. Although the degree of match is also dependent on how well the requests
reflect member agendas, a good match should be highly unlikely if leaders choose
not to accommodate requests at all. Therefore, of crucial importance here is to
what degree we should expect leadership to accommodate requests and under what
conditions they are more or less likely to do so.
Leadership accommodation is not perfect, yet the evidence appears to indicate
that it is the dominant strategy employed by leaders in assigning members to com-
mittees. In one of the earliest examinations of assignment request data, Rohde and
Shepsle (1973) find that freshmen Democratic members of the House only failed to
receive an assignment to a requested committee 27% of the time, and 47% of fresh-
men received their top choice assignment during the 86th, 87th, and 89th Congresses.
Shepsle (1978) extends this analysis to the 93rd Congress, where he finds that on
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average about 83% of legislators receive one of their requested assignments, and more
than 58% are assigned their top request (see Table 9.1).
Early efforts to examine accommodation in the states were hampered by a lack of
committee request data. As such, two early studies examining the California legisla-
ture resorted to assessing the prestige of committee assignments based on other sig-
nificant factors like tenure, party, and ideology (Robeck 1971; Sokolow and Brandsma
1971). The first assessment of accommodation in the states comes from Francis (1983,
1985), who employs a legislator survey covering all 99 state chambers for 1981, where
he asks how pleased legislators are with their committee assignments. Francis finds
that over 83% of respondents report being “pleased” (the most positive response
category), while less than 3% report being “displeased” (the least positive response
category). There are also very limited differences across states; the Delaware lower
chamber is least satisfied with their assignments, reporting 67% pleased, while for
the Illinois, Louisiana, and Vermont lower chambers, all respondents reported being
pleased. Subsequent examinations of committee request data have provided further
support for leadership accommodation in the state legislatures. Hedlund (1989) found
that, on average, during the mid-seventies to late-eighties in the Wisconsin lower
chamber, virtually two-thirds of all requests were granted and that more than 95% of
legislators received at least one of their requests. Furthermore, Hedlund and Patter-
son (1992) also find evidence of accommodation in all four of the state lower chambers
that they examine. In fact, the accommodation of top choice assignments in these
four states (Iowa, Maine, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) was considerably higher than
the levels uncovered by Rohde and Shepsle (1973) in the U.S. House, ranging from a
high of 100% (Iowa Democrats) to a low of 64% (Pennsylvania Democrats). While
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accommodation appears to dominate in the states as in the U.S. House, the degree
of accommodation varies across states.
More recent scholarship has questioned the degree of accommodation, either ar-
guing that it is much lower than previously estimated (e.g. Cox and McCubbins
1993; Frisch and Kelly 2004, 2006) or that accommodation is conditional on some
other characteristic like party loyalty (Smith and Deering 1984; Cox and McCubbins
1993; Coker and Crain 1994; Kanthak 2009) or legislative tenure (Frisch and Kelly
2004). Generally, these scholars argue that the previous findings for accommodation
were the product of looking primarily to first term U.S. House Democrats over a rel-
atively small period of time (Eulau 1985; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Frisch and Kelly
2004). Their results, however, do not undermine the accommodation hypothesis. For
example, in examining both first term and incumbent members of the House from
both parties for the 86th through the 103rd Congresses, Frisch and Kelly (2004) find
that 41% of assignment requests are granted. While this might appear lower than we
would expect given the earlier findings, it is difficult to compare Frisch and Kelly’s
result with previous work, as they report the percent of successful requests as opposed
to the percent of legislators receiving a requested assignment. This distinction is im-
portant, as legislators tend to request more assignments than they receive (Rohde
and Shepsle 1973; Shepsle 1978; Hedlund 1989; Hedlund and Patterson 1992). As
Cox and McCubbins (1993) point out, accommodation is not perfect, but member
requests still appear to be a significant predictor of committee assignments.
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1.1.2 Member Motivations for Requests for Assignments
If member requests are accommodated to a large degree, then the nature of those
requests become of vital importance in understanding the connection between assign-
ments and agendas. To understand where these requests come from we must consider
the individual motivations that underly their development. In what follows, I outline
the various motives for requests discussed in the literature and conclude that pol-
icy priorities, either emerging from the constituency or the personal interests of the
member, dominate requests for assignment to policy committees.
Fenno (1973) argues that members pursue committee assignments because they
are perceived to be instrumental in achieving their goals. Based on extensive in-
terviews with Democratic members of the 84th through 89th House sessions, Fenno
identified three primary goals in obtaining committee assignments: influence within
the chamber, re-election, and good public policy. Using this tripartite scheme, Fenno
is able to classify congressional committees according to their members’ articulated
goals. For example, he finds the “desire to have more influence inside the House...
is the distinctive, dominant goal” for members of the Appropriations and Ways and
Means committees (3). This should not be surprising given that the control commit-
tees have less rigid policy jurisdictions and can influence the outcomes of virtually
any bill. Committees like Interior and Post Office provide opportunities for members
to secure pork for their district, and, thus, the members of these committees tend to
articulate re-election related goals (Fenno 1973, 5-7). Finally, those committees with
explicit policy jurisdictions, like Education, Labor, and Judiciary, attract legislators
who demonstrate an interest in the specific policy and spouse good public policy
as their goal (Fenno 1973, 9-10). While congressional interviews have consistently
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pointed to Fenno’s three goals (Fenno 1973; Bullock 1976; Smith and Deering 1983),
the statistical evidence has been much harder to come by (Eulau 1985).
The interview data indicate that influence in the chamber is the least common
of the three goals (Fenno 1973; Bullock 1976; Smith and Deering 1983). Because
my interest is in the match between committees and policy interests, and this is the
only goal that is not directly related to policy content, I will only briefly discuss it
here. The goal of chamber influence–also frequently referred to as prestige–is focused
on those committees that exert disproportionate influence in the legislative process,
most typically Appropriations, Way and Means, and Rules. Bullock (1976), relying on
interviews with members of the 92nd House, shows that preferences for committees
based on “prestige” were not only the least common, but also the least likely to
be accommodated by the leadership. Of the 117 committee preferences mentioned
by the 52 respondents, only 16 (13.7%) were related to prestige or influence in the
chamber, and none of those preferences were accommodated (see Table 3). Committee
property rights and seniority norms in the House certainly make it so memberships
of the powerful committees tend to be locked in prior to the assignment process,
leading to both infrequent prestige requests and low levels of accommodation of these
infrequent requests.
Mayhew (1974) may be the most well-known expositor of the legislative re-election
hypothesis, yet more than a decade before The Electoral Connection, Masters (1961)
stated that “[t]he most important single factor in distributing assignments to... com-
mittees is whether a particular place will help to insure the re-election of the member
in question” (354). Legislators can use committee assignments to advance their elec-
toral goals because being on the right committee can elevate a member’s reputation in
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the district and allow the member to more efficiently advance district interests (Bul-
lock 1972; Fenno 1973). The re-election goal is much more common than influence
within the chamber. Bullock (1976) reports that 46% of requests were re-election
based for the 92nd House, and Smith and Deering (1983) show a similar number for
the 97th.6 Furthermore, Bullock (1976) shows that more than 53% of these requests
are accommodated.7
Although the re-election goal is grounded in theory, it has been difficult for schol-
ars to find empirical evidence that such considerations contribute to committee as-
signments. In this regard, scholars have generally examined committee assignments
as a function of the members’ electoral safety, where unsafe members are presumed
to receive better assignments to help them get re-elected. Bullock (1972) examines
assignments for House members of both parties during the 80th through 90th Con-
gresses, to determine if members in unsafe districts are more likely to receive “good”
assignments.8 Not only does he fail to find support for this argument, but when dif-
ferences between safe and unsafe members are statistically significant they are in the
wrong direction. Similar results have been found for members of the House during
the 95th to the 97th Congresses (Smith and Ray 1983), as well as among a small sam-
ple of states (Hedlund and Patterson 1992). However, Rohde and Shesple (1973) do
find evidence that coming from an unsafe district makes it more likely that first-term
members will receive their first choice assignments and very slightly less likely that
6Smith and Deering (1983) do not use the term “re-election,” rather they settle on describing
these same motivations as “district” motivations.
7Smith and Deering (1983) do not identify the proportion of requests that are accommodated.
8Bullock identifies assignments as “good” if he determines they have disproportionate power
in the chamber or if the committee jurisdiction would be of interest to constituents. He matches
committees with “interested” districts based on various geographic and demographic district char-
acteristics.
16
they will receive an assignment they did not request. At best, then, we have signifi-
cantly mixed results for this proposition, yet these results speak more to the tendency
of leaders to ignore the re-election goals of members than it speaks to the motivations
behind member requests. In combining interviews with request data, Bullock (1976)
is able to asses whether a lack of electoral safety contributes to re-election motivated
requests. He finds that 92% of the electorally vulnerable members in the sample ar-
ticulated re-election goals, compared to only 57% of the least vulnerable, indicating
that re-election is a significant motivator for member request behavior.
The insistence of members regarding the re-election goal in interviews, coupled
with the weak empirical evidence, has led some scholars to reevaluate this concept
in favor of a broader “constituency goal” (Smith and Deering 1983, 85). Under this
conceptualization, these goals are related to satisfying some need in the constituency
but not necessarily directly related to electoral vulnerability (Adler and Lapinski
1997). This expansion of the re-election goal follows the insights from the distributive
theory of legislative organization (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Shepsle and Weingast
1995), where members “self-select” into committee assignments that will be especially
fruitful in offering constituency service given the make-up of their particular district.
For example, members with large farming constituencies should be drawn to the
Agriculture committee, and those with high levels of military employments should
be drawn to Armed Services. While these constituency concerns could easily be
motivated by re-election, they could also be the result of simply pursuing constituent
interests as part of being a good representative.
Ray (1980) was one of the first to explicitly test the proposition that significant
constituency interests draw members to particular committees. From the 92nd to
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the 94th Congresses, he finds that Democratic freshman are more likely to request
committee assignments on committees that control disproportionately high levels of
spending for their district. Using district-level Census data, Adler and Lapinski
(1997) expand on this finding by showing that a great many House committees are
composed of “high-demand” members. These results, however, appear to be limited
to a few committees with easily identifiable policy jurisdictions and corresponding
constituency characteristics (Frisch and Kelly 2004, 2006).9 As Frisch and Kelly
note (2006), the effects of constituency characteristics should be limited to those
relatively rare districts where there is a “well-organized single interest,” allowing for
members personal policy interests to drive committee assignments in the vast majority
of instances (96-7).
Policy interests are perhaps the most difficult member goal to evaluate empirically
due to significant problems measuring member interests, yet it is the most commonly
identified set of motivations among interviewed members (Bullock 1976; Smith and
Deering 1983). The literature is generally adamant that “requests [for committees]
reflect interests” (Shelpse 1978, 76; see also Frisch and Kelly 2004, 2006). Due to these
measurement issues, the empirical results regarding the effect of the policy motivation
have largely been restricted to an examination of member occupations as an indicator
of policy interest. Shepsle (1978) incorporates measures of member occupation—as
indicators of personal policy interest—in his models of freshman request behavior and
finds that they are significant predictors of requests for many of the policy committees
in the House. Similarly, Jewell and Patterson (1986, 16) find that, in several state
9It is unclear whether the existing null results for many committees is due to the lack of a good
corresponding measure of constituency interests for those committees or if the committee simply
does not draw members as predicted by the theory.
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legislatures, substantive policy committees tend to over-represent occupations related
to their jurisdiction, a finding also confirmed by later work in other states (e.g. Hamm
1986; Hamm, Hedlund and Post 2011).
The distinction between member policy interests and constituency interests is of-
ten blurred in the literature, where scholars prefer to think about policy interests as
a motivation that can originate externally, through the constituency, or internally, as
a result of personal factors (e.g. Shepsle 1978; Hamm 1986). The difficulty in distin-
guishing among personal and constituency policy motivations parallels that between
electoral and district motivations. In other words, while we are confident that policy
interests play a role in committee assignments, the literature has been agnostic on the
underlying source of these interests when it comes to identifying empirical predictors
of requests and assignments.
Based on the evidence presented above, we can conclude that both requests and as-
signments to substantive policy committees are motivated by member interests in the
policy jurisdiction of the committee—whether this interest is rooted in constituency
or personal characteristics. While there is some evidence that electoral vulnerabil-
ity and party loyalty might condition the accommodating decisions of leaders (e.g.
Rohde and Shepsle 1973; Cox and McCubbins 1993), there is very little reason to
believe that they structure members’ preference for committees directly. Addition-
ally, the motivation of influence in the chamber does appear to drive members to
pursue assignments on control committees, but because these committees generally
have disproportionate influence across policy jurisdictions, they also have high utility
for advancing one’s policy agenda. In total, the existing literature supports Shepsle’s
(1978) contention that member preferences for committees “reflect interests” and that
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this proposition “appears unassailable” (76).
1.2 The Match: Committee Assignments & Policy
Agendas
Up to this point, I have emphasized that members pursue committees based on their
policy interests and that the leadership largely accommodates members’ committee
preferences as they are expressed in formal requests. As mentioned above, if we
assume this chain is strictly adhered to, members will request committees that deal
with policies important to them (or their constituents), and leaders will accommodate
these requests, leading, in turn, to committee assignments reflective of individual
member policy priorities. Given this sequence and the arguments outlined above,
we might have little reason to expect any kind of mis-match between agendas and
committee assignments; however, there are certain considerations that can contribute
to a stronger or weaker match. These considerations specifically address the degree
to which the process successfully translates the previous input into its connected
output at both the initial phase of request formulation and the subsequent leadership
accommodation phase. I will begin by considering the ways in which agendas might
not be accurately or thoroughly reflected in requests.
The first barrier to a successful match arises from the strategic consideration
that members make in their requests and advertising for committee assignments. As
Shepsle (1978) argues, official committee requests (“revealed preferences” in Shepsle’s
terms) are different from actual preferences for committees. While these actual prefer-
ences for committees are unobservable and driven by personal and constituency policy
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concerns, requests are the result of an “expected value calculus,” where members tem-
per their true assignment preferences based on the perceived likelihood of receiving
the requested assignments (64). Thus, members may not request the committees
most important to their policy goals if they are broadly popular, and the likelihood
of assignment is low. This recognition illuminates an endogenous relationship in the
process of accommodation, whereby the probability of assignment by leadership is
determined by requests, which, in turn, are shaped by member perceptions of the
probability of assignment.10
A second barrier to the translation of agendas into requests comes from the capa-
bilities of the members. Those legislators with more experience with and knowledge
about their constituency, legislative organization, and process should be more capable
of effectively articulating their agendas through assignment requests. As mentioned
above, agendas are at least partially constructed from constituency interests, and,
therefore, members who have a better understanding of the priorities in the districts
should be better equipped to request assignments relevant to those priorities. Mem-
bers must also have an understanding of how those priorities match onto the policy
space created by the committee system. Some knowledge about or experience in the
legislature should help those members to identify the committees most relevant to the
issues on their agenda. This kind of experience should also contribute to members’
understanding of the probability of assignment to specific committees. Therefore,
while experience might help members make better requests given their agendas, it
could also make them more sensitive to the strategic considerations described above.
In Figure 1.2, I add these factors affecting the development of member requests to the
10Although not articulated in these terms, Cox and McCubbins (1993) level a similar critique
against the accommodation and self-selection hypotheses (30-1).
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basic model. In both the case of strategic considerations and member capabilities, the
consequences for the matching of assignments and policy priorities should be clear.
If members’ policy interests and priorities are not fully expressed in their requests,
then even perfect accommodation could lead to significant mis-matches.
Figure 1.2: Factors Affecting the Translation of Agendas
into Assignment Requests
Unlike strategic requests or member capabilities, the next barrier to a successful
match imposes limits on leaders. Leaders might face significant institutional obstacles
in trying to accommodate requests. While many have argued that chamber leader-
ship can expand or contract the committee system to suit their needs (e.g. Westfiled
1974; Shepsle 1978), there are limitations in this regard. Specifically, leaders face a
series of incentives that limit the desirability of constant expansion of seats on pop-
ular committees. First, as Shepsle (1978) points out, a popular committee’s value
may be inversely related to its size. Seats on small committees with important pol-
icy jurisdictions consolidate influence within that policy realm among a few, making
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assignments to those committees extremely valuable. The larger the committee be-
comes, the less influence any single member should have, thus, reducing the value of
the committee. In addition to devaluation of committee assignments, leaders are also
restrained in expanding the committees system by the need for an efficient division
of labor in the chamber. As the size of a committee increases, the same logistical and
collective-action problems present in the parent chamber begin to arise in committee.
Simply creating more committees—as opposed to expanding existing committees—
cannot resolve these issues, either. New committees would either have to share policy
jurisdictions with existing ones or would not satisfy the policy needs of existing mem-
bers, making expansion pointless. In the former instance, overlapping jurisdictions
pose the same problems of devaluation and loss of efficiency as expanding existing
committees (King 1997).11
These limits on the expansion of the committee system make it so that assignments
are a finite resource for members. This can pose a challenge for matching assignments
to policy interests as the potential breadth of the latter is, theoretically, unlimited.
In the U.S. House, most members have one or two committee assignments,12 yet, in
most cases, it would be unreasonable to assume that any member’s personal policy
agenda would be so narrow. In the states, the number of assignments varies more
drastically within and across chambers. Table 1.2 shows summary statistics for the
number of committee assignments in lower chambers across 12 states and the U.S
House for 2011.
11Here I am referring to expansion that is motivated by a leadership accommodation strategy
and not by demand for new committees with new policy jurisdictions. This kind of demand for
expansion results from the emergence of new issues or the increased salience of existing issues.
12In 2011, for example, 82% of House members had one (37%) or two (45%) assignments. A little
more than 17% had three assignments, and only two members had four.
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Table 1.2: Standing Committee Assignments in the Lower
Chambers of 12 States and the U.S. House of Representatives:
2011
state Min Mean Sd Max
Alaska 1 1.973 .986 4
California 2 4.244 .825 6
Colorado 1 2.048 .556 3
Illinois 1 4.560 1.159 7
Michigan 1 2.583 1.078 5
Minnesota 1 3.038 .802 5
New Hampshire 1 1.015 .122 2
Oklahoma 1 2.970 .562 4
Pennsylvania 1 3.280 1.161 7
Texas 2 2.530 .731 5
Virginia 1 3.010 .611 4
Vermont 1 1.040 .197 2
Total 1 2.640 1.390 7
U.S Congress 1 1.800 .730 4
Note: Leadership with no committee assignments are excluded.
What is immediately apparent in Table 1.2 is that some states seem to offer many
more assignments to their members than Congress, but this is not always the case.
Half of the states in the table (Alaska, Colorado, Michigan, New Hampshire, Texas,
and Vermont) that offer fewer assignments on average than their counterpart at the
national-level. If we are to consider assignments as reflective of a member’s policy
agenda, there are significant opportunities for poor matches. In none of the chambers
in Table 1.2 are you guaranteed to get more than two assignments. In seven of the
state chambers, members should expect to get less than three assignments, and in
only California and Illinois should members expect to get more than four. Thus,
there are several institutional contexts across these chambers that make the match
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between assignments and policy agendas more difficult to achieve.
In addition to institutional constraints, the degree of familiarity with and the
partisan affiliation of the member making a request should also strongly condition
leadership accommodation of that request. The leadership might be hesitant to as-
sign members that they are less familiar with highly sought after committees simply
because they cannot be certain of the members qualifications or intentions. This
means that we expect for leaders to more eagerly accommodate those members whom
they are more confident will use the assignment effectively. Leaders should also fa-
vor members of their own party, because they are more likely to have policy goals
in common. If leaders intend to use the committee system to control the legislative
agenda (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1993), they have very strong incentives to ensure
that the majority of committee members are unlikely to shirk their authority. Figure
1.3 completes the basic model with the influences affecting the translation of requests
into assignments. As with agendas, when assignments are not reflective of requests,
the probability of matched agendas and assignments should be lower.
To this point, I have argued that members are motivated primarily by policy
considerations when articulating their preferred committee assignments, explicitly
connecting requests to member agendas. Furthermore, relying on the extensive liter-
ature on the U.S House and from the American states, I show that the leaderships’
dominant strategy in the assignment process is the accommodation of member re-
quests. If we follow the sequence outlined in Figure 1.1, the above two statements
should lead to committee assignments that are reflective of individual agendas. There
are, however, several factors that muddle the translation of agendas into requests and,
subsequently, requests into assignments. These factors are summarized in figures 1.2
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Figure 1.3: Factors Affecting the Translation of Member
Requests into Assignments
and 1.3. While I have demonstrated that there is a a general connection between
agendas and committee assignments, I have done little to demonstrate the impor-
tance of this connection. In subsequent chapters, I propose a means of measuring
the match, demonstrate its importance in the processing of legislative proposals, and
expound on the model in Figure 1.3 in order to better identify those characteristics
that contribute or detract from the match.
1.3 The Data
In order to explore the nature of the connection between agendas and committee as-
signments, I rely on data from a sample of 12 state lower chambers from 2011-2016.13
13The data are structured by two year sessions in order to accommodate significant differences
across the states. First, because not all chambers meet every year, I was unable to disaggregate
the data into yearly units. Since no chamber has sessions longer that two years, I aggregated up
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Although the sample was largely selected based on data availability, it nonetheless
maintains a good deal of the variation on important factors that we find across all
states. The main dataset is comprised of legislative rules, committee assignments,
and individual member legislative activity (bill introductions, sponsorships, commit-
tee actions, etc). At various points in the analysis, these data will be supplemented
with others on state institutions, member ideology (Shor and McCarthy 2011), parti-
sanship, tenure, electoral results (Klarner et al 2013), and legislative positions/roles.14
The rules data for the sample chambers come from the official legislative record as
obtained via the legislature’s website or directly from chamber clerks. In particular,
I collected the specific rules related to how committees are assigned and the role of
committees in the legislative process.15 Standing committee assignments, as well as
the assigned chairs and vice chairs, were collected from legislative journals and official
chamber websites. In the vast majority of cases, the assignments to the standing
committees are all printed in the legislative journals and made publicly available. The
detailed legislative activity—which includes bill sponsorship, co-sponsorship, and bill
actions (amendments, votes, committee action etc)—were obtained from Open States.
Open States is a third-party service that collects publicly available state legislative
data from official sources, such as state legislative websites and publications, using
to two year sessions. This creates another problem, however, because one state (VA) is on an odd
year election cycle, which would force the two year sessions to contain different sets of legislators.
Fortunately, I am able to overcome this problem by relying on 2010 data for this one state. In
the case of Virginia, the two-year sessions are made up of 2010-11, 2012-13, and 2014-15 legislative
activity, while all other states use 2011-12, 2013-14, 2015-16 data.
14Data on state institutions come from various sources, including The Book of the States, and the
National Conference on State Legislatures’ website. Legislator partisanship, tenure, and institutional
roles were obtained from official legislative journals, and websites, as well as certain on-line archival
sources such as Ballotpedia and Project Vote Smart.
15Anzia and Jackman (2015) have collected data on the role of committees in the states, based
on surveys of chamber clerks. I relied on these data to validate the content analysis of the session
rules for each of the 12 sample states.
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automated scraping techniques.16
To ensure the validity of the legislative activity data, I compared a random sample
of bill-level Open States data from each state with the official legislative journal
published by the chamber. These data have proven highly reliable in a significant
number of states, and where the Open States data do have errors, they appear to
arise in particular states, primarily due to oddly formatted or continually changing
websites or publications.17 Due to some differences in the reporting across sources,
it was necessary to manually match individual legislator identification numbers from
the Open States data with names, as they appear, in journals and other primary
sources.
The sample of chambers constitutes the full range of states for which crucial data
were available over the study period. Figure 1.4 identifies the sample states as well as
the sources of missing data for each of the 37 chambers not in the sample. The most
common form of missing data was archived committee assignments. While current
committee assignments can commonly be found on most state legislative websites,
records of past assignments can be harder to obtain. In total, 29 states do not have
adequate records of committee assignments covering the study period. Of these 29,
12 do not provide archived copies of legislative journals, which is the most common
place to find archived committee assignments. In terms of the legislative activity data
from Open States, there were two main challenges. As will become apparent when
16More information on Open States’ methodologies as well as access to the data are available on
their website: https://openstates.org/.
17One example of a common issue in the Open States data is that significant changes in naming
conventions or the use of nicknames will often result in duplicating legislator observations. Through
an exhaustive process of manually comparing names across journals, Open States, and online news
sources I have consolidated these duplicates and dealt with other similarly predictable issues in the
sample data.
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I outline my measurement strategy in the next chapter, I rely on primary bill spon-
sorship and the bills’ committee(s) of reference to develop an estimate of members’
agendas. While these data are available for most states through Open States, there
are some significant limitations. First, 14 states do not provide reliable data on the
primary sponsor of bills in the chamber. It is important that the data distinguish
between primary sponsors, who are active in the development of the proposal, and
co-sponsors, who are mostly demonstrating support. The Open States data does dis-
tinguish between the two, but not all states report this distinction (e.g., Kansas), and
some states only report the first named sponsor (e.g., Kentucky), regardless of their
level of involvement in the development of the bill. There are also an additional three
states that do not identify the committee of reference for referred bills in their bill
actions data. While these states do identify when bills are sent to committee, they
do not name the committee.
The states in white in Figure 1.4 are those for which I have complete data and make
up the sample. While the sample is not random, it is a relatively good representation
of the variation we find across the country on several relevant characteristics. In terms
of the sample’s geographic distribution, we have representation from all four Census
regions, and eight of the nine Census divisions.18 In terms of Elizar’s typology of
state political culture, the sample contains six moralistic states, three traditionalistic
states, and two individualistic states.19
The sample is also quite representative on a series of other important factors.
18Only the East South Central Division–which includes Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and
Tennessee–is not represented in the sample. A listing of Census Bureau regions and divisions is
available on their website here: https://www2.census.gov/geo/docs/maps-data/maps/reg div.txt.
19Alaska was not a state at the time of Elazar’s writing, but we could speculate that it might be
classified as individualistic, perhaps with some moralistic elements.
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Figure 1.5 compares the sample to the population of states across eight important
factors. What we find in Figure 1.5 is that, on most characteristics, the average value
of the sample is quite close to the global average. The sample states do, however,
have slightly larger populations, chamber sizes, and committee systems on average
than those states not in the sample. Additionally, the sample chambers are slightly
more professionalized and polarized on average than non-sample chambers. Yet, if we
examine the distributions of the sample compared to non-sample states on these eight
characteristics, we find that the range of values in our sample states does an excellent
job covering the extent of those values in the population. The one shortcoming of
the sample that becomes apparent in Figure 1.5 is that it does not include any of
those chambers with very small margins of party control or very low levels of party
polarization. In terms of these two characteristics, however, these missing states tend
to be outliers, and the sample does do a good job representing the central group of
states on this front.
One final consideration concerning the sample has to do with the rules governing
the committee assignment process. We need a sample that is sufficiently represen-
tative of the different methods of assigning committees so as to test the potential
effects of these differences in the process of committee-agenda matching. I have con-
ducted an extensive content analysis of the chamber rules governing the assignment
processes in the sample states. Table 1.3 presents the rules outlining the assignment
authority and defining the fundamental institutional components of the committee
system for the sample chambers. Unlike the data presented in table 1.1, table 1.3
provides a more complete picture of the process. What we find is that in six of the
sample states, the Speaker has complete authority to assign majority and minority
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Figure 1.5: Representativeness of the State Sample Across Eight Characteristics:
2011
Party Polarizatione
Party Marginc
Professionalizationd
# Committeesc
Chamber Sizec
% Urbana
Unemploymentb
Populationa
Min. Max.
Range of Values Across All States
States:
Out of Sample
In Sample
 
Means:
Global Mean
Sample Mean
Sources:
a2011 American Community Survey (Census).
bU.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
c2011 Book of the States.
dSquire (2017).
eShor and McCarthy (2011).
members to committees and as chairs and vice-chairs. In Texas, the Speaker fills half
of all assignments, leaving the other half to be filled by seniority. Additionally, in
Vermont, the Speaker holds the appointment powers, but the decisions of the Speaker
can be challenged by a majority of the chamber. We have another three states where
members are assigned to committees by their party’s leadership= and two more that
use a Committee on Committees with mandatory chamber approval. If we compare
this array of assignment procedures with those reflected in table 1.1, we find that we
have excellent representation of the different methods in the states, except for the
rarely used party caucus method, to which the subsequent analysis will not be able
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to speak to.
In addition to the assignment authority, table 1.3 also provides the rules gov-
erning the committee names/numbers, sizes, jurisdictions, and partisan balancing
requirements. We find that in all sample states, except for Oklahoma, the number of
committees and their names are explicitly defined in the chamber rules. In Oklahoma,
the numbers, names, and jurisdictions are all left to the discretion of the Speaker. In
five of the 12 sample states, the sizes of each committee are also explicitly defined
in the rules, while in another three chambers the rules place some limitations or re-
quirements on committee sizes. The remaining four states either do not explicitly
reference committee sizes in the rules or explicitly allow the Speaker discretion in
setting them. Finally, in many states, the rules require a certain balance of party
members on each committee. Half of the sample states make specific requirements
in this regard, while the other half have no such rules. Five chambers require the
partisan balance on committee to reflect that of the parent chamber, as closely as
possible, while in Pennsylvania they set a fixed ratio of majority to minority members,
regardless of the ratio in the parent chamber.
We can see that the assignment authority in the sample states tends to be much
more consolidated than at the federal level, granting a limited number of party leaders
significant powers in establishing the committee system. In Oklahoma, we see perhaps
the most centralized system in the sample. The Oklahoma Speaker not only has
complete discretion over the assignment of majority and minority members, but also
over the appointing of chairs and vice chairs, the names, sizes, and jurisdictions of
the committees, as well as the partisan (im)balance of members on the committees.
Contrast that with the experiences in Alaska, where there is less centralization, but
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more than we see in the U.S House. In Alaska, the Speaker appoints a Committee
on Committees, which she chairs, which is made up of four other members, and
which makes all of the assignments for all members.20 The rules explicitly define the
committees, their sizes, and their jurisdictions, and the membership of each committee
must have a partisan balance reflective of the parent chamber.
Although the sample of chambers examined in this project is highly dependent on
data availability, I am confident that it nonetheless serves as a good representation of
the general institutions and contexts we find across the American states. Although
the sample accounts for about a quarter of the state lower chambers, it still provides
extensive variation across many important characteristics, including geography, insti-
tutional arrangements, committee systems, and partisan influences. The subsequent
chapters make extensive use of these data to illustrate the importance and sources of
committee-agenda matching in American state legislatures.
1.4 The Plan for the Project
The goal of the project is to demonstrate the importance of the connection between
committee assignments and personal agendas and to explore the nature of this con-
nection in the American state context. The first order of business in this regard is
to define and empirically operationalize the concept of the match. In Chapter 2, I
undertake the complex task proposing a measure of committee-agenda matching. I
20Although there is no requirement for there to be minority members on the Committee on
Committees, the Speaker will frequently assign an additional two members of the minority as non-
voting members. This puts the actual size of the committee at seven, even though the rules only
specify five members. This unofficial courtesy was confirmed through conversations with the chamber
clerk’s office.
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argue that we can take advantage of the “revealed policy interest” of legislators, as
expressed in their legislative activity, to estimate individualized agendas. I, then,
propose a means of comparing these agendas with members’ committee assignments
to produce a measure of the match.
In Chapter 3, I take on the central premise of the project, by considering the effects
of the match on the functioning of the legislature. Specifically, I argue that when
committee assignments are more closely aligned with a legislator’s policy agenda, the
legislator is more active in their committees’ policy jurisdictions, and their activity
is more likely to be accepted by other members and leaders, allowing them to more
successfully shepherd their bills through the legislative process. In this chapter, I
demonstrate the utility of a good match to legislators, as well as the conditions under
which a good match is likely to translate into more legislative effectiveness.
In Chapter 4, I consider the sources of variation in committee-agenda matches
both within and across state chambers. Using a more fully articulated version of
the basic model of committee assignments (Figure 1.1) outlined above, I argue that
the match is the product of several factors that influence the assignment process. I
identify several individual characteristics and institutional features that condition the
match, allowing us to investigate the contexts under which matching is more or less
likely. I, then, conclude with a summary of the nature and effects of committee-agenda
matching, what this concept contributes to the study of legislatures and legislators, as
well as the direction for future research on legislative committees, committee systems,
and their connections to legislator agendas.
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Chapter 2
Revealed Policy Priorities
and Measuring the
Committee-Agenda Match
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I presented a model of committee assignments that focuses on
the matching of agendas with those assignments. I have argued that legislators have
incentives to pursue assignments that comport with their policy agendas and that
leadership usually has incentives to accommodate member requests. The remainder
of this project considers the causes and consequences of the match, which requires
the development of an empirical measure of the concept. To this point, scholars
have not attempted a measure of the committee-agenda match; although, measures
of the related concepts of leadership accommodation (e.g., Rohde and Shepsle 1973;
Shepsle 1978; Hedlund 1989; Hedlund and Patterson 1992) or assignment value (e.g.,
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Bullock and Sprague 1969; Munger 1988; Francis 1985; Grosclose and Steward 1998,
1999 ) do exist. The primary difficulty in measuring the match is devising a means
of estimating individual policy agendas against which we can evaluate a member’s
committee assignments. In this chapter, I propose a means of measuring these agendas
that leverages a large amount of data on legislative activity to uncover, what I call,
“revealed policy agendas.” I, then, compare the revealed policy agendas to the actual
assignments to generate a measure of the match between the two.
In what follows, I make an argument for using legislative activity data to illustrate
individual member policy priorities, drawing on contemporary legislative research
and detailed archival records. I, then, outline a method for relating these policy
priorities to committee assignments in such a way that produces a measure of the
distance between their agendas and assignments (Committee-Agenda Distance) and,
then, examine the match in the 12 sample states, revealing some general patterns. I
conclude this chapter with a discussion of potential alternative measures of agendas
that rely on committee requests or legislator survey data. I conclude that, for different
reasons, relying on the revealed agendas should produce a more consistent and reliable
measure of the committee-agenda match.
2.2 Revealed Policy Agendas
To ascertain the degree of alignment between committee assignments and policy agen-
das, we need some measure of those policy issues of interest to particular members.
I define a legislator’s agenda as the subset of policy issues that they emphasize and
prioritize. Here, I draw on recent scholarship at the national-level that relies on aggre-
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gating a large number of discrete legislative activities beyond roll-call voting to build
relevant individual measures. Several of these studies rely on introductions, sponsor-
ships, and co-sponsorships of bills1 to develop measures of interconnectedness (Fowler
2006; Tam Cho and Fowler 2010), bipartisanship (Harbridge 2015), or position-taking
(Rocca and Gordon 2010). Most importantly for this project, these data have also
been used to estimate legislator agendas, both at the national-level (Sulkin 2011) and
in the states (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Barnello and Bratton 2007).
Sulkin (2011) provides the most complete justification for the use of legislative
activity in measuring legislator agendas, while investigating if members of Congress
pursue their campaign promises through their legislative agendas. Like this project,
Sullkin’s investigation requires a measure of legislative agendas that can easily be
compared and related to another measure—in her case, campaign promises; in mine,
committee assignments. Sulkin utilizes bill introductions and co-sponsorships to as-
sign “ownership” of bills to legislators and then estimate members’ agendas by looking
at the policy areas addressed by each member’s “owned” bills (Sulkin 2011). I employ
a similar strategy in state chambers, modified slightly to conform to the dimension-
ality of the state committee systems.
As Sulkin (2011) notes, however, this process assumes that introduction and co-
sponsorship are meaningful legislative behaviors (30), a view not necessarily held by
early legislative scholars (see Hall 1996, 50-1). If we are to assume the meaningful-
ness of introduction and co-sponsorship, we must understand the purpose of those
1The terminology for the concepts of introductions, sponsors, and co-sponsors varies across
the states. In this paper, a bill sponsor—occasionally referred to in the states as “author” or
“primary sponsor”—is(are) the legislator(s) that introduces the bill in question. Introductions are
the number of bills introduced by the sponsor. Co-sponsors are members, who are not responsible
for introductions but sponsor a bill as a sign of support.
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behaviors. Because most bills never become law, we cannot reasonably assume that
members expect to always change policy directly when they introduce or sponsor
legislation. Furthermore, if the benefits involved in passing legislation are accrued
regardless of the effort applied, there appears to be little incentive to engage in the
costly process of preparing and introducing bills even if policy change is the proximate
goal (Olson 1965; Hall 1996). Yet, legislators tend to introduce legislation at high
rates.2
Perhaps, legislative activity is more meaningful than previously believed. Perhaps
even, as Sinclair remarks: “members need legislation (1995, 301).” Tamerius (1995)
argues that sponsorship should be particularly meaningful given that it is one of the
most resource intensive forms of legislative activity. She argues that because sponsors
tend to be involved in the drafting of their bills and active in corralling support for
them, they require much greater commitment to and knowledge about the policy
being addressed. She demonstrates that while female members of the U.S. House
account for just barely half of the votes in favor of “feminist” bills, they account for
more that 90% of the bills’ sponsors. Barnello and Bratton (2007) find similar gender
effects on sponsorship across 15 state legislatures. Tamerius goes on to argue that this
gap reflects differences in agendas that cannot be revealed by roll-call votes, which
tell us little about priorities (see also Hall 1996).
Legislators also use bill sponsorships as a means of advertising not only their po-
sitions, but also their activity. Sponsorship can signal to constituents that members
are following through on their campaign promises (Sulkin 2011) and to elite donors
2In 2011, across my sample of nine states, there was an average of 2,935 introductions and
511 enactments, giving an average enactment rate of approximately 17%. Illinois had the most
introductions (6,491), and Alaska had the fewest (375).
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that they are a good investment because they are active on policies of interest to the
moneyed elite (Rocca and Gordon 2010). Thus, the motivations to sponsor legislation
are broadly the same as those to request particular committee assignments. Legisla-
tors sponsor bills because they address policies that are important to them personally
or to their constituents.
To measure the match between committee assignments and policy agendas, I
must have a way of relating the two to each other. As argued above, the basis for the
match is policy interest, and, therefore, I require a means of relating committee policy
jurisdictions to the policy areas of sponsored bills. Traditionally, the policy area of
sponsored bills has been determined through analysis of the bill’s content directly. For
example, looking at bills in the U.S. Congress, Sulkin (2011) assigns issue codes to bill
introductions based on existing codification schemes that are meant to be exhaustive
and mutually exclusive. However, because I am interested in comparing agendas
with committee assignments, I utilize the already existing classifications created by
the committee policy jurisdictions. In other words, the policy jurisdictions created
by the committee system also create functional policy categories for the chamber,
upon which I base the issue categorization of sponsored legislation.3 This means that
the dimensionality of the policy space, as conceived of here, varies across chambers
and is tied to committee system structure. Furthermore, instead of coding the policy
substance of individual bills, I rely on legislators and the legislative process to define
the bills’ policy areas, themselves, by looking to which policy committee the bill is
refereed to.4
3I omit committees that do not have a substantive policy jurisdiction. This primarily included
the control committees of Rules, Ways and Means, and Appropriations, as well as those committees
performing these functions but differently named.
4Because sponsored bills are usually referred to committee after members have received their
assignments, concerns may arise that this method relies on an endogenous account of legislators
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2.3 Measuring the Committee-Agenda Match
Once the policy jurisdictions of sponsored legislation have been determined, I compare
each member’s distribution of sponsored bills5 to their distribution of committee
assignments across the same policy jurisdictions. One of the great advantages of
using legislative activity in this way is that the comparison is made easier by a shared
set of policy areas between agendas (as measured here) and committee assignments.
I calculate the committee-agenda distance for each legislators as the summed, positive
deviations from average legislative activity, across policy jurisdictions, and outside of
their committee portfolio. The resulting measure provides a sum of “agenda weights”
for those agenda items not covered by a legislator’s committee assignments. While
this description sounds complicated, the intuition behind the measure is straight-
forward. Let us delve deeper into the above definition to examine each constituent
part.
The first, and most complicated, step is to measure the agenda of a member based
on their legislative activity, as outlined above. This involves compiling a list of the
member’s primary sponsored bills and determining to which committee(s) they are
referred. Because different policy areas will be emphasized in different chambers,
we then tag committee jurisdictions as being within a member’s agenda if they send
agendas. Specifically, if the type of bills introduced or the committees they are referred to are
conditioned by assignments, then my measure might not account for the distance between two
independent distributions. Specifically, were assignments to encourage legislators to work on issues
outside of their committee portfolios, the measure would artificially inflate distance. However, it
is unlikely that committee assignments, even those outside of the member’s agenda, would compel
members to work outside of their committee portfolio. Rather, the effect of committee assignments
would most likely encourage legislators to engage more on issues in their committee portfolio than
we might expect from their agenda. In this case, because the equation below ignores the proportion
of in-committee sponsorships, this concern is significantly mitigated.
5I specifically only look at bills with policy content. Therefore, I drop all resolutions, as well as
bills not sent to policy committees.
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Table 2.1: Calculating the Committee-Agenda Distance for a Hypothetical Legislator
(L)
Chamber Committees
Agriculture Commerce Education
Natural
Resources
Transporta-
tion
1. Proportion of L’s Bills .000 .400 .250 .050 .300
2. Average Proportion .187 .283 .210 .040 .280
3. L’s Deviations -.187 .117 .040 .010 .020
4. L’s Assignments X X
5. L’s Positive Deviations
Outside Committee
.167 .010
Committee-Agenda
Distance .177
(Sum Values from Line 5)
a higher proportion of their bills to that committee than the average legislator. I
examine legislators’ proportion of bills as opposed to the number because I expect for
there to be significant variation in legislative activity across members. The degree
to which the committee jurisdiction is in their agenda is determined by the relative,
above-average frequency that their bills go to that committee. Therefore, the “positive
deviations from the average” represent the degree to which the proportion of the
members activity in a committee exceeds the average proportion in the chamber.
The more the proportion exceeds the average (“positive deviation”), the more space
the policy area takes up on the member’s agenda. Lines one through three of Table
2.1 show how the calculation for this portion of the measure is made.
The hypothetical example in Table 2.1 is based on a legislature with five com-
mittees. For our legislator ‘L’, we begin by determining what proportion of her bills
were sent to which committees (line 1) and then compare that to the average pro-
portion of bills going to the committees (line 2). We then calculate the deviations
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from the average, where positive values mean that L sent a higher proportion of bills
to the committee than the average legislator. In Table 2.1, the positive deviation
are identified in bold on line 3. We ignore the negative deviation on the agriculture
committee because it simply indicates that agriculture issues are not a priority for
L. This provides us with an estimate of L’s agenda, which is composed of Commerce
related issue, followed by Education, Transportation, and Natural Resources, where
the positive deviations weight the importance of agenda items and are referred to as
agenda weights.
With the estimate of the member’s agenda in hand, I now compare it to the
legislator’s committee assignments. We accomplish this by summing over the agenda
weights, ignoring any for which the legislator sits on the corresponding committee
(Table 2.1, line 5). In other words, when the legislator sits on a committee whose
jurisdiction is on their agenda, I count it as a match and treat the agenda weight as
being accounted for in their assignments (i.e., equals zero). Therefore, the resulting
Committee-Agenda Distance is the sum of agenda weights on non-matched agenda
items. Formally, the measure is calculated as follows:
C-A-Dikt =
N∑
c=1
R
(
(Piktc − P¯ktc) |1− αic|
)
(2.1)
Where:
• i indexes the legislators (sponsors).
• k indexes the chambers.
• t indexes the sessions.
• c indexes the committees.
• Pikjc is legislator i’s proportion of sponsored bills that go to committee c in
chamber k for session j.
• P¯ktc is the average chamber proportion of sponsored bills that go to committee
c in chamber k for session j.
45
• αiktc is a dichotomous (0,1) indicator where 1 indicates that legislator i is as-
signed to committee c.
• R() is the Ramp function: R(x) :=
{
x, x ≥ 0;
0, x < 0
Equation 2.1 provides us with an individual-level and continuous measure of
matching between committees and agendas, where smaller values (distances) equate
to better matches. This measure can range from zero to one,6 where a zero repre-
sents a perfect match and no legislative activity outside of committee assignments. A
committee-agenda distance of one would represent a perfect mis-match, where all of
the member’s legislative activity occurs on bills outside of their committees. Figure
2.1 shows the distribution of committee-agenda distance in the sample lower cham-
bers.
From Figure 2.1 we can see that in most chambers, the average committee-agenda
distance is below .5, where the exception is for New Hampshire (.58). Furthermore,
within each chamber there is a significant amount of variation, with California hav-
ing the smallest (sd = .106) and New Hampshire having the largest (sd = .328).
We also find some patterns across chambers in Figure 2.1. In almost half of the
chambers (California, Illinois, Oklahoma, Texas, and Vermont) committee-agenda
distances appear normally distributed around the mean. In another five chambers
(Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia), we observe distribu-
tions with longer right-sided tails. In these states we can say that a large number
of legislators have relatively good matches, at the expense of a few with particularly
poor ones. In New Hampshire we see a quite significant left-sided tail. This indicates
that most New Hampshire legislators have pretty poor matches (right-sided peak),
6Although this measure could theoretically reach 1, those scenarios are not realistic. As such
the in-sample maximum is .98.
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Figure 2.1: The Distribution of Committee-Agenda Distance
by State Lower Chamber
0 .5 1
Alaska
0 .5 1
California
0 .5 1
Colorado
0 .5 1
Illinois
0 .5 1
Michigan
0 .5 1
Minnesota
0 .5 1
New Hampshire
0 .5 1
Oklahoma
0 .5 1
Pennsylvania
0 .5 1
Texas
0 .5 1
Virginia
0 .5 1
Vermont
2011 2013 2015
Legislative Session
NOTE: Vertical dashed lines and gray area indicate chamber means and 95% C.I., respect-
fully. Vertical red lines indicate the median. The global mean is .349 with a standard
deviation of .24.
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while a select few have quite good ones. Finally, we also see that most chambers in the
sample have relatively stable distributions of committee-agenda distances over time.
There are, however, a few chambers where significant change over time can be ob-
served. In Alaska and Minnesota, for example, the distribution of committee-agenda
distances become more uniform in 2015, indicating that there might have been a more
egalitarian distribution of assignments in that year for those chambers.
2.4 Potential Alternative Measures
The measure proposed takes advantage of a large amount of data to estimate legis-
lators’ personal agendas and compare them to their committee assignments. While
the arguments made above provide theoretical support for the measure, to assuage
concerns, this section considers other possible alternatives. Unfortunately, because
the concept of the match has not been measured before in the literature, we must
compare my proposal to other potentially reasonable ones. Additionally, the data
tends to be quite limited for most potential alternatives, and thus, where, neces-
sary, I simulate reasonable data, and then comparatively evaluate the qualities of the
different measures on those data.7
I consider two potential alternatives to my measure of the match. They are both
based off of different means of accessing individual agendas. The first, which comes
from the extensive literature on leadership accommodation (E.g Rohde and Shepsle
1973; Shepsle 1978; Hedlund 1989; Hedlund and Patterson 1992), relies on data on
7Chapter 4 examines the covariates of the proposed measure, and shows that many of those theo-
retically important characteristics do move the measure as predicted. Because I conduct that analysis
for theoretical and substantive reasons, I employ a different validation strategy here. Nonetheless,
the results in Chapter 4 also provide additional support for the measure.
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member requests for assignment. The second method, which is generally reflected
in the approach used by Francis (1989), consists of relying on surveys to measure
members’ agendas and/or preferences for committees. In what follows, I discuss
some of the relative shortcomings of these two approaches.
2.4.1 Committee Request Data
An alternative measure of the match could follow the work done on leadership accom-
modation and look to requests as an expression of legislators’ agendas. The advantage
of using requests is that they are formal and articulated specifically with the intent
of gaining an assignment so that we do not need to interpret their meaning in any
significant way. Such a measure, however, would assume that requests emerge uninter-
rupted from member agendas, an assumption already challenged by several scholars
(Shepsle 1978; Cox and McCubbins 1993). As Shepsle (1978) argues, requests are
the result of strategic considerations or an “expected value calculus.” Legislators do
not simply ask for those assignments they believe would be the most useful to them;
they consider the probability of success and adjust their request accordingly. A leg-
islator’s first choice might be the Agriculture committee, but if she knows that it is
everybody’s first choice, she may replace it with her second choice, especially if the
desirability gap between the first and second choices are small. What this means is
that using request data to estimate agendas could lead to measures of the match that
are biased towards finding better matches. We can illustrate this point with some
hypothetical data generated form a theoretical model.
Given the strategic nature of requests, we can assume that whether or not a mem-
ber makes a request for a committee is a function of the relative value of that assign-
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ment over others and the probability of being assigned to the committee if requested.
Following the discussions in the previous chapter, we further assume that the value
of the committee is a function of the legislator’s agenda weights. Furthermore, the
probability of assignment is a function of the aggregate desirability (agenda weight)
of committees among all legislators. In other words, if demand for the committee
is high, the probability of any particular member being assigned is low. Therefore,
we can determine if a member will request a committee assignment entirely from the
array of agenda weights in the chamber. For example, let us consider a hypothet-
ical model legislature with 15 members and five committees, where each members
makes two requests and receives one assignment, making it so the committees each
have three members. Table 2.2 provides simulated agenda weights for just such a
chamber.8
The entries in Table 2.2 can be thought of as proportions, where each weight
represents the proportion of the legislator’s agenda devoted to the issue area. Based
on the agenda weights, we can calculate the probability that a member will request
a committee by following the outlined process above. First, we have to calculate
the naive probability of assignment based on the agenda weights. We do this by
assuming that every member in the chamber will request their top two assignments.
We then count the number of expected requests for the committee and divide that
by the number of assignments to the committee, in this case three. In the case of
committee (a) in Table 2.2, we would expect for it to be requested five times since it is
8The simulated weights are drawn from univariate normal distributions, adjusted in the aggregate
to reflect a general chamber preference for committee (e). In any chamber, one or a few committees
are likely to be more popular than others. I have attempted to reflect this in the simulated agenda
weights. Below, I consider the effect that different aggregate distributions of agenda weights have
on strategic considerations.
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Table 2.2: Agenda Weights for Hypothetical Legislative Cham-
ber of 15 Members with Five Committees (a-e)
Legislators
Committees
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1 .022 (3) .428 (2) .022 (4) .022 (5) .505 (1)
2 .306 (2) .016 (5) .302 (3) .016 (4) .359 (1)
3 .438 (2) .022 (4) .022 (5) .022 (3) .495 (1)
4 .444 (2) .023 (5) .023 (4) .023 (3) .486 (1)
5 .023 (3) .023 (4) .023 (5) .446 (2) .484 (1)
6 .022 (5) .479 (1) .022 (4) .022 (3) .455 (2)
7 .442 (2) .024 (4) .024 (3) .024 (5) .487 (1)
8 .023 (5) .023 (3) .023 (4) .468 (1) .464 (2)
9 .041 (2) .041 (3) .041 (4) .041 (5) .836 (1)
10 .043 (5) .043 (2) .043 (4) .043 (3) .829 (1)
11 .043 (3) .043 (2) .043 (4) .043 (5) .828 (1)
12 .044 (4) .044 (5) .044 (3) .044 (2) .823 (1)
13 .045 (5) .046 (2) .046 (3) .046 (4) .817 (1)
14 .042 (3) .834 (1) .041 (4) .041 (5) .042 (2)
15 .048 (4) .809 (1) .048 (5) .048 (3) .048 (2)
Note: Cell entries are agenda weights, while the legislator committee rankings are
in parentheses.
in the top two for five members. The naive probability of being assigned to committee
(a) is then 3/5 or .6. The naive probability of assignment for all five hypothetical
committees are presented in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Naive Probability of Assignment to 5 Hypothetical
Committees (a-e)
Committees
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
.600 .429 1 1 .200
With this probability in hand, we can determine if a legislator will request a
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specific committee by comparing the probability weighted desirabilities of each com-
mittee. Specifically, we multiply the desirability of the committee (agenda weight) by
the probability of assignment and then select as requests the two committees corre-
sponding to the top values. This produces strategic committee preferences that form
the basis for assignment request. Table 2.4 provides the top two committees based
on both strategic and sincere preferences.9
Table 2.4: Top Two Committee Rankings for a Hypothetical Legislative
Chamber: Strategic and Sincere Preferences
Legislators
Committees
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1 0 \ 0 1 \ 2 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 2 \ 1
2 2 \ 2 0 \ 0 1 \ 0 0 \ 0 0 \ 1
3 1 \ 2 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 2 \ 1
4 1 \ 2 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 2 \ 1
5 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 1 \ 2 2 \ 1
6 0 \ 0 1 \ 1 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 2 \ 2
7 1 \ 2 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 2 \ 1
8 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 1 \ 1 2 \ 2
9 0 \ 2 0 \ 0 2 \ 0 0 \ 0 1 \ 1
10 0 \ 0 0 \ 2 0 \ 0 2 \ 0 1 \ 1
11 0 \ 0 0 \ 2 2 \ 0 0 \ 0 1 \ 1
12 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 2 \ 2 1 \ 1
13 0 \ 0 0 \ 2 2 \ 0 0 \ 0 1 \ 1
14 0 \ 0 1 \ 1 2 \ 0 0 \ 0 0 \ 2
15 0 \ 0 1 \ 1 0 \ 0 2 \ 0 0 \ 2
Note: The number before the slash is the request ranks based on probability
weighted desirability. The number after the slash is the agenda weight rank. Cells
where the two values differ are in bold.
What we find in Table 2.4 is that a significant number of sincere preferences for
9The sincere preferences are equivalent to the agenda weights. Even in the, unlikely, case where
preferences are distributed uniformly in the aggregate, we still see significant distortions from strate-
gic considerations.
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committees do not get expressed in the requests because of strategic discounting. Five
of 11 members who had committee (e) ranked as their top sincere choice now rank
it second, with a sixth who no longer ranks it at all, and two more who ranked it
second and now do not rank it at all. Five of the 15 legislators swapped the rankings
of their first and second choices, while nine maintained their first choice and only
four maintained their second. In total, only three legislators’ sincere and strategic
preferences remained the same (# 6, 8 and 12).
Furthermore, the amount that requests diverge from sincere preferences is a func-
tion of the aggregate distribution of preferences across committees. Because those
aggregate preference structures are the basis for legislators’ assessments of the proba-
bility of assignment, the more they are consolidated on one or a few committees, the
more likely it is for strategic preferences to differ from sincere ones. In the example
in Table 2.2, the agenda weights were constructed to reflect a chamber tendency to
prefer committee (e). In Figure 2.2 I present more broad results of simulations that
capture the effect of the aggregate distribution of agenda weights on the degree of
discounting caused by strategic considerations.
What we find in Figure 2.2 is that there are significant reductions in the proportion
of members who keep their first and second choice requests as the popularity of
committee assignments becomes more consolidated. As the figure shows, on average
members are more likely to keep their second choice than their first, but under none
of the simulations examined here should we expect for great proportions of members
to keep their sincere preferences for committees. It also appears that the popularity
and the number of relatively popular committees both matter. Note that the left
most simulation scenario is the same for both the dotted and dashed lines and that as
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the relative popularity of the popular committees increases, the two lines diverge. In
other words, when the popular committees are more plentiful, there is an even smaller
chance that strategic considerations will not alter legislators’ request behavior.
This last point about the aggregate distribution of agenda weights is quite im-
portant as uniform distributions seem particularly unlikely. Beyond the traditional
prestige or control committees, there should also be certain policy committees that are
predictably more sought after on average than others. In states with large agricultural
bases, we would certainly expect for the agriculture committee to be quite popular,
especially compared to the committee on public pensions, which might appeal more
in states with larger urban populations. Thus, the use of request data would be most
troubling in those contexts that we expect to be most realistic; i.e. where the agenda
weights are consolidated on a few committees. In these cases, strategic considerations
can shift preferences for committee assignments quite drastically.
2.4.2 Survey Based Measures
Potential survey measures of legislator agendas do not face the same types of strategic
considerations that are present in the process of formulating assignment requests.
Legislators do not face the same pressures to get a good assignments when they are
answering a survey as they do when they are devising requests. This is not to say
that we should expect survey responses to perfectly reflect agendas. In fact, the use
of surveys could potentially be even more problematic than relying on request data
for three main reasons.
First, elite surveys have been suffering from decreasing response rates over the
last few decades (Maestas, Neely, and Richardson 2003; Fisher and Herrick 2013).
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These decreasing response rates would make it very difficult to conduct the kind of
research proposed here, as it would make it almost impossible to derive agendas for
the majority or entirety of legislative chambers examined. Furthermore, whenever
response rates are low, we have to consider the possibility for non-response bias,
which occurs if non-response is somehow systematic. We should expect that certain
chambers and certain members within chambers will be less likely to respond to
surveys, whether because of a distrust of academics or a simple lack of time, these
reasons can be related to important institutions or individual characteristics. In
these cases, the resulting survey based agendas would only be reflective of part of
the story and we could be severely limited in our explanations if these agendas are
systematically related to important features like professionalization or partisanship.
Second, although the strategic considerations are different from those related to
request data, members might also be inclined to respond strategically to surveys.
For example, Francis (1985) finds that only 3 percent of respondents in his survey
of state legislators said that they were “displeased” with their assignments. While it
is possible that members are being accommodated to a very high degree, it is also
possible that respondents are adjusting their responses due to their expectations in
this case. For example, If we asked respondents about their preferred committee
assignments, they might respond with their strategic requests, in order to force their
“preferences” to conform to their expectations.
Third, surveys can be costly to field and would require a significant time commit-
ment in order to create the type of time-series data used in this project. Although
various technologies have reduced the financial costs of fielding surveys, obtaining
representative responses from state legislators would require significantly more re-
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sources than collecting legislative activity data directly. Furthermore, surveys would
restrict us to looking only to future legislatures and members. The legislative activity
data, on the other hand, can be obtainable from official legislative journals, which
have been published, in most chambers, going back decades, if not to the founding of
the state or before.
2.5 Conclusion
Much of the validity of the measure of committee-agenda distance proposed in this
chapter relies on the theoretical argument that legislators will be more active on
policies that are more important to them. This forms the basis for my measure of
legislator agendas, as it has for other scholars, as well (Bratton and Haynie 1999;
Barnello and Bratton 2007; Sulkin 2011). The methodological advantages to this
approach over the others discussed above are significant, but there are also other
more practical advantages. Unlike request or survey data, legislative activity data
is becoming more and more available with the advent of the digital technologies.
Although the state legislatures have been relatively slow to digitize their archived
records, this process has begun in several states. In more than half of the states,
legislative journals for the last five session are available on-line, and services like
Open States have been reliably compiling activity data since 2011.
Conversely, increases in party polarization and skepticism of academia will prob-
ably make, the already difficult to acquire, request data less obtainable in the future.
The existing studies that have used request data at the state-level have only examined
one state in isolation (Hedlund 1989) or a small set of states (Hedlund and Patterson
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1992) due to the general unwillingness of elites to supply these key data. Hedlund
(1989) recounts one typical response to requests for these data as follows:
...there are certain matters that are confidential that I have not included.
These include the individual assignment requests from the members and
how my decisions compared with their requests. This is a matter that has
always remained confidential between the head of our two houses and the
members. I believe that it should remain that way (600).
Similar trends have already been documented for legislator surveys, where we observe
decreasing response rates (Maestas, Neely, and Richardson 2003; Fisher and Herrick
2013). Furthermore, where the costs of fielding a survey tends to be prohibitive for
many legislative scholars, the legislative activity data is usually available for free.
All of these considerations make the measure I propose here, not only theoretically
justifiable, but practically preferable to its alternatives.
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Chapter 3
Committee-Agenda Matching and
the Effective State Legislator
3.1 Introduction
I have argued to this point that there is such a concept as the committee-agenda
match, I have discussed its theoretical roots, and I have proposed an empirical mea-
sure. I have made the case that committee requests are a function of member policy
interests, committee assignments largely follow from requests, and that we can mea-
sure members’ policy agendas using their bill introductions. In this chapter, I test
the central argument of this project, that the committee-agenda match does mat-
ter for the processing of legislative proposals. Specifically, I contend that the match
should be of interest to legislative scholars because it conditions members’ ability to
shepherd their bills through the various obstacles and impediments of the legislative
process. Thus, those members with significant advantages in terms of their match,
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should have significant advantages in getting their preferred proposals passed.
I begin this chapter by outlining the reasons that I expect for legislators with
better matches to perform better in the legislature. The intuition is rather simple:
both members of the relevant policy committee and the floor should favor bills that
are introduced by those members who also sit on the relevant policy committee over
those who do not. If this is true, then members with better matches should be more
effective. For any specific bill, the relevant policy committee is that policy committee
whose jurisdiction covers the content of the bill. When I refer to bills introduced by
members of the relevant policy committee, I mean those bills whose sponsor sits on
the policy committee(s) for which the bill is destined to be assigned. When there is a
significant mismatch between a legislator’s agenda and their committee assignments,
that legislator will sponsor bills covering policies not in their committee portfolio
to meet the needs of their agenda. If we have reasons to believe that these bills fair
worse than their counterparts sponsored by a relevant policy committee member, then
we should expect for the mismatch to decrease the legislator’s effectiveness. Below, I
outline the compelling reasons for considering bills introduced by members of relevant
policy committees to, on average, do better.
Once I have articulated my argument connecting the committee-agenda match
with legislative effectiveness, I, then, evaluate potential ways in which this relationship
might vary across individuals and chambers. Building on a large body of work on
party control of the legislative process (e.g. Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Maltzman
1997; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Cox, Kousser and McCubbins 2010; Anzia and
Jackman 2012), I argue that party status (majority vs. minority) should influence the
translation of privileged (i.e., matched) committee positions into legislative successes,
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and that the conditional effects of party should be concentrated in chambers that
grant committees gatekeeping powers. I, then, present two measures of legislative
effectiveness to use as dependent variables in the analysis. The results of linear
random-intercept models provide support for my hypotheses and demonstrate the
importance of the concept of committee-agenda matching for legislative outcomes.
3.1.1 Favoring Bills Introduced by Members of Relevant Pol-
icy Committees
There are several reasons why we should expect that proposals originating from mem-
bers of the relevant policy committee would fair better than those that do not. First,
when a bill gets to the relevant policy committee, the members of that committee
should be more accepting of proposals coming from co-members than those intro-
duced by non-members. Members spend a significant amount of time in committee
and, thus, are more likely to know more about their committee co-members than
those they do not sit on a committee with, particularly with regard to the commit-
tee’s policy jurisdiction. Committee members, then, should favor bills introduced by
committee co-members because they can be more certain about the policy intentions
of the sponsor. Committee members might also show deference to bills introduced by
committee co-members, in order to gain favor within their working group. If there are
multiple, similar proposals, a committee co-member’s bill might be favored in expec-
tation of reciprocity from other committee co-members in the future. Additionally,
committee co-member sponsored bills are also more likely to consider the particular
problems and policy idiosyncrasies that the committee has jointly considered, leading
the bill to appear more appealing and relevant to committee members.
61
A bill sponsored by a member of the relevant policy committee might also be
favored on the floor. The division of labor inherent to the committee system can lead
to specialization, which the chamber might rely on for policy specific information
otherwise unavailable to them (Krehbiel 1991). In this context, it would be rational
for the floor to prefer a bill sponsored by members of the relevant policy committee
as an “expert proposal” versus those proposals introduced by members not seen as
specialized in the particular policy area. Therefore, we should expect for introduc-
tions emerging from relevant policy committee members to be favored by the policy
committee in question, as well as the broader chamber.
This relatively simple intuition, combined with the insight that significant mis-
matches will lead to the sponsoring of bills outside of assignments, leads me to the
central hypothesis of this chapter:
H1: All things equal, members with poor matches between their commit-
tee assignments and policy agendas will be less effective at shepherding
their bills through the legislative process than those with better matches.
3.1.2 Conditional Hypotheses
In addition to my primary hypothesis that the committee-agenda match helps leg-
islators be more effective, I also argue that this relationship is conditioned by both
political and institutional factors. First, because the parties structure debate in the
chambers and the majority party has the numerical advantage in committee and on
the floor, I expect for party status to strongly condition the effects of the committee-
agenda match. Majority members who have a good match find that they not only are
in the right committees given their interests, but that they also have more influence
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within the committee than their minority member counterparts (Cox and McCub-
bins 2005). In essence, majority party members gain more leverage on the legislative
process by being on the right committees than minority members because they can
use the match more effectively to promote their agenda:
H2: All things equal, the positive effect of the committee-agenda match
on legislative effectiveness will be more pronounced for majority party
members than for minority party members.
So far I have argued that the committee-agenda match should benefit all mem-
bers but that majority members gain a particular advantage; however, there may be
contexts where this is not the case. I expect the rules governing committee power in
the chamber to further condition the partisan benefits of a good match. In partic-
ular, I am concerned with negative-agenda powers or the ability of committees and
committee chairs to block proposals from reaching the floor. Several scholars have
emphasized this feature of procedural control as an essential element of majority
party power in the chamber (Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Maltzman 1997; Cox and
McCubbins 1993, 2005). Majority members can utilize these negative agenda powers
to ensure that the majority party does not get rolled on floor votes by preventing po-
tentially troublesome proposals from leaving committee (Cox and McCubbins 2005).
Typically, this negative agenda power is referred to as committee gatekeeping (Shepsle
and Weingast 1987; Maltzman 1997; Crombez, Groseclose, and Krehbiel 2006; Anzia
and Jackman 2012).
Scholars have recently turned their attention to agenda control powers in the
American states, in order to overcome the problems of relatively static institutions
at the national-level. Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins (2010) use quasi-experiments
in two states to demonstrate the effects of changing institutional arrangements on
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majority power. In both California and Colorado,1 they find that the presence of
majority party agenda power decreases majority role rates, increases minority roll
rates, and shifts policy towards the majority party’s median, as expected. Anzia and
Jackman (2012) engage in a similar study of the effects of agenda control on majority
power in the states using an expansive sample of 96 state chambers. They find that
committee gatekeeping powers reduce majority roll rates by 3.7 percentage points,
which is quite significant considering that 83 chambers had majority roll rates of less
than 10%.
In the context of the committee-agenda match, I expect for the presence of com-
mittee gatekeeping power to mitigate the positive effects of the match on effectiveness
for the minority party and increase the effect for the majority. The reason for this
boils down to majority party control of the committees. If the majority party can
ensure their majority on committee, they can monopolize the gatekeeping role at
the expense of the minority. In Table 3.1, I report the partisan balance in the 12
state chambers and the average balance on committee. As the table confirms, the
majority party tends to maintain majorities on most committees,2 and, except for
in Texas where the party margin is the greatest, the majority party tends to be
over-represented in committee.
Therefore, we should expect majority parties to monopolize gatekeeping where
it is present, at the expense of minority members. This should increase the relative
1For California, the majority has agenda powers on some bills but not on others; therefore, the
comparison was across bill types. In Colorado, the legislature changed its rules after the 1987-88
session, removing committee gatekeeping and requiring all bills to be reported from committee in
the order they were received. For Colorado, then, the authors compare across sessions (Cox, Kousser
and McCubbins 2010).
2Only in the Agriculture and Conservation and Higher Education committees in the Illinois
House do we see the minority party hold a majority of committee members. In both instances they
have only one more member than the majority.
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Table 3.1: Majority Party Control Of Standing Committees in the Sample State
Lower Chambers (2011)
Majority %
In Chamber
Avg. Majority
% in Committee
95 % C.I.
Average Committee
Deviation form
Chambera
Alaska 60.00 64.89 [61.03, 68.75] 4.89
California 65.00 66.32 [65.06, 67.58] 1.32
Colorado 50.77 54.69 [53.69, 55.69] 3.92
Illinois 54.24 55.44 [54.45, 56.42] 1.20
Michigan 57.27 63.40 [61.91, 64.89] 6.13
Minnesota 53.73 57.95 [57.09, 58.81] 4.22
New Hampshire 74.00 74.49 [73.48, 75.49] .49
Oklahoma 69.31 70.19 [69.28, 71.10] .88
Pennsylvania 55.17 60.00 [60.00, 60.00] 4.83
Texas 67.33 66.52 [63.99, 69.05] −.81
Virginia 58.00 61.60 [59.89, 63.31] 3.60
Vermont 62.67 64.54 [61.74, 67.34] 1.88
aPositive deviations indicate that, on average, committees over-represent the majority, while
negative ones indicate average under-representation of the majority in committee.
advantage from a good match for the majority:
H3: All things equal, the benefit of a good committee-agenda match for
the majority party will be greater relative to the minority in states with
committee gatekeeping powers.
In H3 I contend that committee gatekeeping power exerts an asymmetric effect
on majority and minority matches in such a way that majority members are signifi-
cantly more advantaged by a good match than minority members, compared to states
without gatekeeping. Because gatekeeping powers accrue to the majority and can be
used at the expense of the minority, the advantages of good committee assignments
take on a more partisan color in states with these rules.
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3.2 Data & Methods
The dependent variable in this analysis is individual legislative effectiveness, which I
have defined as a member’s ability to shepherd their proposals through the legislative
process. I propose two separate measures of legislative effectiveness, one that assesses
the average success of proposals and the other that considers cumulative effectiveness.
Early work on legislative effectiveness usually followed one of two measurement strate-
gies. First, a series of works relied on surveys of various elites to develop perceptual
measures of individual legislative effectiveness (Meyer 1980, Francis 1962, 1989, Weis-
sert 1991a 1991b, Hall 1992, Miquel and Snyder 2006). While these measures have
the advantage of capturing perceived influence that might not be picked up by the
legislative record (Volden and Wiseman 2014), they also have some serious setbacks.
Surveys, especially across several chambers, can be expensive and time consuming
to field. Many elites—whether other legislators, lobbyists, or staffers—might have
little to say about the majority of members, focusing on only a few who are particu-
larly outspoken and influential. Additionally, surveys are also prone to non-response
bias and various forms of response bias that might be more problematic given the
particularly salient and politically relevant contexts that these elite respondents find
themselves in. Surveys were not a feasible or desirable approach for this project, and,
so, let us turn to the second method.
The second approach to measuring legislative effectiveness is to calculate the suc-
cess rates of sponsored legislation. Most commonly, scholars consider the proportion
of a legislators sponsored bills that become law (Mathews 1960; Frantzich 1979, Moore
and Thomas 1991, Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999; Bratton and Haymie 1999; An-
derson et. al. 2003, Cox and Terry 2008, Hasecke and Mycoff 2007, Kousser 2007).
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This approach improves on the survey-based methods by relying only on the published
record and removing the potential for perceptual biases that come with survey-based
measures. My first measure of legislative efficiency follows this line of research and is
a simple “hit-rate” (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999) indicating the proportion of
sponsored bills that are eventually enacted into law. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution
of hit-rates across the lower chambers of the sample, indicating a significant amount
of variation both across and within chambers.
Figure 3.1: The Distribution of Legislative Hit Rates by State Lower
Chamber
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NOTE: Dashed lines indicate chamber means. The global mean is .213 with a
standard deviation of .233.
While hit-rates avoid the perceptual and administrative pitfalls of the survey
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based measures, they have some shortcomings of their own. As Kousser (2007) notes,
hit-rates say absolutely nothing about how active members are in general. More im-
portantly, however, hit rates ignore the important intervening stages of the legislative
process (Volden and Wiseman 2014). Volden and Wiseman (2014) argue that pro-
gression through the legislative stages contributes to effectiveness, even when bills fail
to become enacted. They demonstrate that progression that falls short of enactment
does still influence a legislators ability to move future legislation forward. Volden and
Wiseman propose a Legislative Effectiveness Score that accounts for progress at five
specific stages of the legislative process: bill introduction, action in committee, action
out of committee, passes the chamber, and becomes law (2014, 25).
The second measure of legislative efficiency used in this analysis follows the in-
sights from Volden and Wiseman (2014) and considers the progression of bills through
the process.3 I measure State legislative effectiveness scores (SLE scores) with the
following equation:
SLESikt =
[
BILLikt
N∑
j=1
BILLjkt
+
AICikt
N∑
j=1
AICjkt
+
ABCikt
N∑
j=1
ABCjkt
+
PASSikt
N∑
j=1
PASSjkt
+
LAWikt
N∑
j=1
LAWjkt
][
N¯
5
]
(3.1)
Where:4
• i indexes the legislators (sponsors).
• k indexes the chambers.
• t indexes the sessions.
• BILL is a bill introduction.
3In addition to considering progression through these stages, Volden and Wiseman’s (2014)
measure also accounts for the importance of bills through a weighting system. Unfortunately, the
data necessary to differentiate between bills in this manner is not yet available at the state-level.
4I use the same notation as Volden and Wiseman (2014).
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• AIC is a bill that receives committee action.
• ABC is a bill that receives action out of committee.
• PASS is a bill that passes the chamber.
• LAW is a bill that becomes law.
• N¯ is the average number of legislators by chamber.
The measure is a cumulative sum of proportions that is then normalized by the
weight N¯
5
to set the global mean to one. SLE scores have several appealing fea-
tures. First, because the denominator of the fractions at each stage is a subset of
the one in the previous stage, each stage is naturally weighted based on the propen-
sity of bills to get to that stage in the chamber. For example, if there are 500
introductions and legislator i sponsored 10 of them, the proportion at the first stage
(BILLikt/
∑N
j=1BILLjkt) would be .02. However, if only 100 of the 500 introductions
receive actions in committee, but if all of i’s 10 bills are included among them, the
proportion at the second stage (AICikt/
∑N
j=1AICjkt), for the same 10 bills, would
equal .1 due to the change in the denominator. Because bills that received committee
action were five times less common than introductions, each bill receiving action in
committee was weighted five times that of an introduction. This natural weighting
based on the prevalence of legislation reaching each step allows me to avoid arti-
ficially weighting each stage. The downside to this feature of the measure is that
because it implements chamber specific weights, some of the cross-chamber variation
is diminished.5 From Figure 3.2, which shows the distribution of SLE scores across
the sample, we can see that the chamber means are more consistent (around one)
than with the hit rate. We still see a good amount of variation within chambers, and
5Volden and Wiseman also normalize the measure by multiplying it my N5 , which sets the
chamber means to one. I do not perform this standardization, in order to maintain as much cross-
chamber variation as possible. Instead, I standardize by the average number of legislators divided
by 5. See equation 2.
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the distributions take a variety of shapes across chambers. While the similarity in
cross-chamber means might make it more difficult to assess the effects of chamber-
level variables (H3 ), any result nevertheless supporting these hypotheses should be
considered particularly encouraging, given that this dependent variable slightly biases
us against finding such effects.
Figure 3.2: The Distribution of State Legislative Effectiveness Scores by
State Lower Chamber
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NOTE: Dashed lines indicate chamber means. The global mean is .714 with a
standard deviation of .663.
In addition to the natural weighting, the SLE score also differentiates among high
and low producers of introductions, where the hit rate does not. Therefore, this
measure allows us to differentiate between successful, high producing legislators and
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just successful ones. In fact, the SLE score is strongly correlated with the number of
bills a legislators introduces across all chambers (Pearson’s = .471). If we examine
the correlations by chamber, we find an even stronger connection, with a maximum
of .837 in Illinois to a minimum of .513 in Minnesota. Therefore, the SLE score
provides information on the cumulative effectiveness, as opposed to just the average
effectiveness.
To test the conditional hypotheses, I require additional data on member party
status (H2 ) and the chamber rules governing committee gatekeeping (H3 ) . Member
party affiliation is recorded in the Open States data and was extensively cross-checked
with legislative journals to ensure validity. To determine majority status, I rely on the
Book of the States. In terms of the gatekeeping status of standing committees, Anzia
and Jackman (2012) have collected data on committee gatekeeping in all 99 partisan
state chambers using a survey of legislative clerks.6 I incorporate their dichotomous
indicator as my measure of committee gatekeeping.
In the multivariate analysis, I also control for various other potential confounders.
First, I include two controls for general policy orientation: party affiliation, and
ideological extremism. To control for party affiliation I use a dichotomous variable
indicating if the legislator is a Democrat; although, I have no specific expectations
regarding this variable. For extremism I rely on the ideological distance from the
chamber median, as calculated by Shor and McCarty (2011).7 I include another
four controls related to the legislators’ general status in the chamber, where I expect
6Although Anzia and Jackman are examining roll-rates for the 1999-2000 legislative session, they
collected gatekeeping data based on surveys fielded in 2010. They argue that these institutions have
not changes much since 1999. Since my data begin in 2011, their 2010 survey responses should be
accurate.
7Shor and McCarty have extended the dataset of state legislative ideology to 2014 and made
these data available on their website: https://americanlegislatures.com/data/.
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for higher status to positively affect efficiency. The first indicator of status is a
dichotomous variable for party leadership, which includes the top two leaders of each
party for each chamber. The second status indicator is for committee chairs and
vice chairs. Third, I include an indicator for members with committee assignments
on control committees.8 Given previous findings (Weissel 1991b; Jeydel and Taylor
2003; Miquel and Snyder 2006; Cox and Terry 2008; Volden and Wiseman 2014), I
expect for leaders, committee chairs, and members of control committees to have more
say over outcomes than the average member, which should allow them to have higher
levels of effectiveness. The final legislative status indicator is for legislative tenure,
which I measure as years of service in the chamber. These data were collected from
various sources, including the Klarner et. al. (2013) legislative elections dataset, state
legislative journals, and various online sources for legislative information, including
Ballotpedia.org and local news sources. Tenure has consistently been found to be a
strong indicator of effectiveness at the state- (Meyer 1980; Weissel 1991b; Miquel and
Snyder 2006) and national-level (Moore and Thomas 1991; Jeydel and Taylor 2003;
Cox and Terry 2008; Volden and Wiseman 2014).
I also control for the number of standing committee assignments, which I expect
will increase members’ ability to influence the process and, therefore, should positively
contribute to effectiveness. Because most of the research on legislative effectiveness
has been confined to examining one or a handful of chambers where the number of
assignments varies little, tests for these effects are lacking. For the hit rate model, I
also include a control for each legislator’s number of bill introductions in the chamber.
8Control Committees are coded as follows. AK: Finance, Rules; CA: Appropriations, Revenue &
Taxation, Rules; IL: Appropriations; IL: Revenue & Finance, Rules; MI: Appropriations; MN: Rules
& Legislative Administration, Ways & Means; NH: Ways & Means, Rules; PA: Appropriations; TX:
Appropriations, Rules & Resolutions, Ways & Means; VA: Appropriations, Rules.
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Since the hit rate is an average, I expect for the number of introductions to negatively
affect it, as legislators introduce more legislation, the amount of time and effort
available for any one proposal decreases. I do not include the number of introductions
in the SLE score models because of the strong correlation between the two (see above).
The final individual-level control was obtained from Klarner et al. (2013) and is the
legislator’s electoral vote margin in the previous election. I expect for a smaller
margin to increase effectiveness, as legislators who may be electorally vulnerable try
to secure their future seat advancing the policy interests of their constituents.
In addition to the gatekeeping indicator, I also include two other chamber-level
variables. First, I include the size of the chamber, as measured in seats and obtained
from The Book of the States. I expect for members in larger chambers to have a
more difficult time passing their proposals, as they face more competition than those
in smaller chambers. The last chamber-level control is for the degree of legislative
professionalization (Squire 1992, 2007, 2017). Professionalization is a measure of key
resources—primarily time, pay, and staff—available to the members in a particular
chamber. Higher levels of professionalization should encourage more effectiveness as
members have more resources at their disposal to help them succeed. Finally, I control
for the effects of each session with a dichotomous indicator that takes a value of one
for the second session and zero for the first.
Because I am testing the effects of both individual and chamber-level variables
on an individual-level outcome my data are nested, and, thus, I make use of hier-
archical models with random-intercepts for each chamber.9 The advantage to this
approach is that it addresses the within-chamber correlation among units resulting
9Comparable fixed-effects specifications with quasi-demeaned data (Wooldridge 2009, 489-91)
yield substantively similar results across all models presented in this chapter.
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from chamber-level unobserved heterogeneity, by allowing the intercept to vary by
state (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005). This approach also corrects for downward
biased uncertainty estimates for chamber-level covariates in standard pooled models
(Bickel 2007). Given that I am interested in knowing the effects of chamber-level
variables—specifically relating to the presence of gatekeeping committees— on indi-
vidual behavior, these models are the most appropriate.
3.3 Results
Table 3.2 provides the estimates of my initial random-intercept models of legisla-
tive effectiveness. Model 3.2a presents the estimates for the additive-only model of
legislative hit rates across nine state lower chambers. As hypothesized, committee-
agenda distance has a significant and negative effect on member hit rates. A one
standard-deviation (.265) decrease in committee-agenda distance corresponds to a
3.2% increase in sponsored bills becoming law. We find a similar result for the
SLE score model (3.2b) in Table 3.2, where a one standard-deviation decrease in
committee-agenda distance yields an increase in the SLE score of almost .2. While
these effects are somewhat substantively small, they are nevertheless larger than the
effect of being in the majority party. In all, these results provide support for H1, that
better committee-agenda matches improve legislative effectiveness.
Most of the controls in models 3.2a and 3.2b perform as expected. In both models,
being in the majority party has a significant positive effect on legislative effectiveness,
while ideological distance from the chamber median has a negative one. In general,
the individual status variables have the positive expected effect, but there are small
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Table 3.2: The Effect of Committee-Agenda Distance on Legislative Effi-
ciency in Nine Lower State Chambers
(3.2a) (3.2b)
Legislative
Hit Rate
Legislative
Effectiveness Score
Legislator Variables
C-A Distance −.122∗∗∗ (.019) −.754∗∗∗ (.047)
Majority Party .023 (.012) .181∗∗∗ (.030)
Extemism −.058∗∗∗ (.008) −.049∗ (.020)
Democrat .016∗ (.008) −.080∗∗∗ (.020)
Leader .114∗∗∗ (.033) −.095 (.085)
Com. Chair .031∗∗ (.010) .173∗∗∗ (.025)
Control Com. .002 (.012) .074∗ (.030)
Tenure (Yrs) .001 (.001) .005∗∗ (.002)
# Bills Sponsored −.001∗∗∗ (.000) .019∗∗∗ (.001)
# Coms .007 (.005) .044∗∗∗ (.013)
Vote Margin .021 (.011) .060∗ (.029)
Chamber Variables
Gatekeeping −.172 (.095) −.275 (.268)
Chamber Bills .000 (.000) .000∗∗ (.000)
Chamber Seats .000 (.000) −.002 (.001)
Professionalization .401∗ (.157) .072 (.415)
2013 Session .014 (.008) −.014 (.020)
Constant .349∗∗ (.116) 1.545∗∗∗ (.324)
Error Variance:
Legislator-level .031∗∗∗ (.001) .203∗∗∗ (.006)
Chamber-level .020∗∗∗ (.009) .162∗∗∗ (.067)
Chambers 12 12
N 2335 2335.000
AIC -1394.295 2996.227
Log Likelihood 716.148 -1479.114
ρ .394 .444
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
NOTE: Estimates are coefficients from a hierarchical linear model with random
intercepts for chambers. Standard errors in parentheses.
differences across models. Leadership does not appear to affect the more cumulative
scores but does have a significant positive effect on hit rates. This could indicate that
leaders tend not to be particularly active in introducing proposals, but when they do,
they are more successful, on average, at getting them enacted. A similar but reversed
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case could be made for the effects of being on a control committee. Additionally, as
many others have found, legislative tenure in the chamber is a significant predictor of
legislative effectiveness in both models. Interestingly, once we control for committee-
agenda distance, the effect of the number of committee assignments is no longer
significant in the hit rate model.10 The margin of victory in the previous election is
insignificant in model 3.2b and significant but in the unexpected direction for model
3.2a, indicating that safer members are more effective on average. The final individual
measure in the hit rate model accounts for the number of bills sponsored, which as
expected, is negative and significant.
In terms of the chamber-level variables, I find no significant direct effect for the
presence of gatekeeping committees or the size of the chamber in either model. The
total number of bills introduced does not have an impact on the hit rate, but it does
appear to increase the SLE scores. Finally, the effect of legislative professionalization
is statistically significant and quite substantial in the hit rate model. A one standard
deviation increase in professionalization (.169) increases legislative hit rates by .073,
or 7.3% more of their introductions are eventually enacted. Surprisingly, profession-
alization does not appear to have an effect on SLE scores. It is possible that more
professional legislatures encourage quality proposals at the expense of quantity, which
could explain the differences between the models.
To investigate the effects of majority and minority committee-agenda distance
(H2 ), I introduce an interaction to those models specified in Table 3.2. The models
including this interaction are in Table 3.4. Both models 3.4a and 3.4b show similar
patterns in terms of the interaction between majority party status and committee-
10Corresponding models that exclude the committee-agenda distance variable all find that the
number of committee assignments has a positive and significantly effect on legislative effectiveness.
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agenda distance. Because of the interaction, the coefficient for committee-agenda
distance indicates its effect for members of the minority party (when Majority=0),
where it is negative and significant in both models. The effect for majority members
can be computed by adding the coefficients for committee-agenda distance and that of
the interaction. In both models, the effect for the majority is also negative and statis-
tically significant. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present the effects of a one standard deviation
increase in committee-agenda distance for hit rates and SLE scores, respectively.
From Figure 3.3 we see that majority members can expect 4.2% more of their spon-
sored proposals to be enacted from a one standard-deviation decrease in committee-
agenda distance, while minority members should expect only a 2.1% increase. How-
ever, these two estimated effects have overlapping 95% confidence intervals, which
means that we cannot be confident that they are different from one another. Figure
3.4, however, shows a more drastic partisan conditional effect on SLE scores. A de-
crease in committee-agenda distance of one standard deviation increases SLE scores
by .258 for majority members, while only .129 for minority members. Furthermore,
we have more than 99% confidence that the estimates for majority and minority
members in Figure 3.4 are statistically different from each other. Interestingly, for
both the hit rate model and for the SLE scores model, the majority gains more than
twice the advantage that the minority receives. We also see slight improvements in fit
between Tables 3.2 and 3.4 for both models. Figure 3.3 and, particularly, Figure 3.4
provide strong support for H2, that the positive effect of committee-agenda match on
legislative effectiveness will be stronger for majority members than minority members.
Apart from the effects of committee-agenda matching, we also see that the estimates
for the control variables remain quite stable across specifications.
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Table 3.3: The Interactive Effects of Committee-Agenda Distance, Party Sta-
tus, and Gatekeeping Powers on Legislative Effectiveness in State Lower Cham-
bers
(3.3a) (3.3b)
Legislative
Hit Rate
Legislative
Effectiveness Score
Interactions
C-A Distance −.156∗∗∗ (.038) −.411∗∗∗ (.097)
Majority Party .058∗ (.026) .207∗∗ (.066)
Gatekeeping −.215∗ (.100) −.338 (.276)
C-A-D×Majority −.109∗ (.046) −.309∗∗ (.117)
C-A-D×Gatekeeping .129∗ (.052) −.151 (.131)
Gatekeeping×Majority −.018 (.029) .226∗∗ (.075)
C-A-D×Maj.×GK .090 (.066) −.294 (.168)
Legislator Variables
Extremism −.058∗∗∗ (.008) −.043∗ (.020)
Democrat .017∗ (.008) −.077∗∗∗ (.020)
Leader .105∗∗ (.033) −.060 (.084)
Com. Chair .029∗∗ (.010) .155∗∗∗ (.024)
Control Com. .004 (.012) .075∗ (.030)
Tenure (Yrs) .001 (.001) .005∗∗ (.002)
# Bills Sponsored −.001∗∗∗ (.000) .019∗∗∗ (.001)
# Coms .008 (.005) .036∗∗ (.013)
Vote Margin .022 (.011) .056 (.029)
Chamber Variables
Chamber Bills (.000) (.000)
Chamber Seats (.000) (.001)
Professionalization .410∗∗ (.158) .004 (.412)
2013 Session .012 (.008) −.023 (.020)
Constant .346∗∗ (.120) 1.513∗∗∗ (.329)
Error Variance:
Legislator-level .031∗∗∗ (.001) .198∗∗∗ (.006)
Chamber-level .021∗∗∗ (.009) .164∗∗∗ (.069)
Chambers 12 12
N 2335 2335
AIC -1418.041 2945.506
Log Likelihood 732.02 -1449.753
ρ .410 .454
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
NOTE: Estimates are coefficients from a hierarchical linear model with random inter-
cepts for chambers. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.4: The Interactive Effect of Committee-Agenda Distance and
Party Status on Legislative Efficiency in Twelve Lower State Chambers
(3.2a) (3.2b)
Legislative
Hit Rate
Legislative
Effectiveness Score
Interactions
C-A Distance −.079∗∗ (.026) −.488∗∗∗ (.066)
Majority Party .053∗∗ (.017) .367∗∗∗ (.044)
C-A-D×Majority −.080∗ (.033) −.484∗∗∗ (.084)
Legislator Variables
Extremism −.056∗∗∗ (.008) −.039 (.020)
Democrat .018∗ (.008) −.071∗∗∗ (.020)
Leader .117∗∗∗ (.033) −.081 (.085)
Com. Chair .028∗∗ (.010) .160∗∗∗ (.025)
Control Com. .003 (.012) .078∗∗∗ (.030)
Tenure (Yrs) .001 (.001) .005∗∗∗ (.002)
# Bills Sponsored −.001∗∗∗ (.000) .019∗∗∗ (.001)
# Coms .007 (.005) .041∗∗∗ (.013)
Vote Margin .020 (.011) .056 (.029)
Chamber Variables
Gatekeeping −.173 (.095) −.287 (.269)
Chamber Bills .000 (.000) .000∗∗∗ (.000)
Chamber Seats .000 (.000) −.002 (.001)
Professionalization .395∗ (.157) .032 (.413)
2013 Session .012 (.008) −.021 (.020)
Constant .330∗∗ (.116) 1.433∗∗∗ (.326)
Error Variance:
Legislator-level .031∗∗∗ (.001) .200∗∗∗ (.006)
Chamber-level .020∗∗∗ (.009) .163∗∗∗ (.068)
Chambers 12 12
N 2335 2335
AIC -1398.208 2964.918
Log Likelihood 719.104 -1462.459
ρ .393 .450
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
NOTE: Estimates are coefficients from a hierarchical linear model with random
intercepts for chambers. Standard errors in parentheses.
To test H3, I estimate similar models to those in Table 3.4, except that I also
include the three-way interaction term between committee-agenda distance, major-
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Figure 3.3: The Effects of Committee-Agenda Distance (+1SD) on
State Legislative Effectiveness Scores by Party Status
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Δ Hit Rate
Majority Member
Minority Member
Party Status ∆Yˆ a 95% C.I.
Majority Party −.042∗∗∗ [-.054, -.030]
Minority Party −.021∗∗∗ [-.034, -.007]
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
aCalculated based on the estimates from model 3.4b.
NOTE: The change in the dependent variable results from an increase in committee-
agenda distance by one standard deviation (.265).
ity status, and the presence of committee gatekeeping. Estimates for these mod-
els are in Table 3.3. Because of the three-way interaction, the negative coefficient
for committee-agenda distance represent the effect of going from zero to one on
committee-agenda distance for minority members in chambers without gatekeeping.
To assess the interaction more thoroughly I illustrate the conditional effects for both
models in Figures 3.5 and 3.6.
Figure 3.5 presents the effects of increasing committee-agenda distance by one
standard deviation across four scenarios for model 3.3a. In terms of legislative hit
rates, gatekeeping does not appear to have the expected effect. Specifically, the effect
of gatekeeping seems to be purely additive. The only differences between the Figure
3.5 estimates in gatekeeping chambers and non-gatekeeping chambers seems to be a
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Figure 3.4: The Effects of Committee-Agenda Distance (+1SD) on
State Legislative Effectiveness Scores by Party Status
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Δ Legislative Effectiveness Score
Majority Member
Minority Member
Party Status ∆Yˆ a 95% C.I.
Majority Party −.258∗∗∗ [-.289, -.226]
Minority Party −.129∗∗∗ [-.163, -.095]
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
aCalculated based on the estimates from model 3.4a.
NOTE: The change in the dependent variable results from an increase in committee-
agenda distance by one standard deviation (.265).
universal and consistent decrease in the effects of minority and majority committee-
agenda distance. Gatekeeping does diminish the effect of minority committee-agenda
distance enough that, statistically, we cannot differentiate it from zero, while the
effect for the majority remains significant (p < .01). The two estimates, however,
are not statistically distinct from each other. Most importantly, Figure 3.5 does not
comport with H3, where in gatekeeping states I expected the relative advantage of
the majority would be larger than in non-gatekeeping states. For the hit rate model,
the point estimates are actually closer together for gatekeeping states than for non-
gatekeeping ones; although, the differences in the point estimates are not statistically
significant for either.
A different pattern emerges in the SLE scores model. Figure 3.6 shows the effect
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Figure 3.5: The Effects of Committee-Agenda Distance (+1SD) On Legislative
Hit Rates given Party Status and Committee Gatekeeping Power
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ga
tek
eep
ing
No
 G
ate
ge
ek
ing
-.1 -.075 -.05 -.025 0 .025
Δ Hit Rate
Majority Member
Minority Member
Majority Party Gatekeeping ∆Yˆ a 95% C.I.
X × −.062∗∗∗ [-.079, -.046]
× × −.045∗∗∗ [-.064, -.026]
X X −.019∗∗ [-.038, -.000]
× X −.005 [-.020, .010]
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
a Calculated based on the estimates from model 3.3a.
NOTE: The change in the dependent variable results from an increase in committee-agenda
distance by one standard deviation (.265).
of a one standard deviation decrease in committee-agenda distance for SLE scores
among majority and minority members in gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping states.
From the figure, we can see that in non-gatekeeping states, the point estimates for
majority and minority members are quite close and have overlapping 95% confidence
intervals. In gatekeeping states, the effect seems mostly unchanged for minority
members, while for majority members we see a much stronger negative effect on SLE
scores. Furthermore, as anticipated in H3, the difference among majority and minority
members in gatekeeping states is much greater than in non-gatekeeping states. The
effect for majority members in gatekeeping states is also statistically different from
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Figure 3.6: The Effects of Committee-Agenda Distance (+1SD) On State Legisla-
tive Effectiveness Scores given Party Status and Committee Gatekeeping Power
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Majority Party Gatekeeping ∆Yˆ a 95% C.I.
X × −.128∗∗∗ [-.175, -.081]
× × −.067∗∗ [-.120, -.013]
X X −.219∗∗∗ [-.270, -.168]
× X −.077∗∗∗ [-.128, -.026]
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
a Calculated based on the estimates from model 3.3b.
NOTE: The change in the dependent variable results from an increase in committee-agenda
distance by one standard deviation (.265).
the majority effect in non-gatekeeping states. Figure 3.6 does support H3, in that we
see majority members receiving an increased relative advantage from their matches
in gatekeeping states.
How might we interpret our seemingly contradictory results from Figures 3.5 and
3.6? Very simply, we could say that gatekeeping exerts the expected multiplicative
effect on SLE scores but not on hit rates. As mentioned above, hit rates fail to
account for the quantity of legislation being advanced by members, while the SLE
scores will reward legislators for more introductions. It appears that gatekeeping
exerts a uniform negative effect on the translation of committee-agenda matching into
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a member’s average ability to see their introductions enacted. Perhaps this should
be unsurprising, as gatekeeping should not affect members incentives or abilities to
introduce legislation, but it should constitute a considerable obstacle to the average
progress of proposals. In other words, gatekeeping should have an effect on the
more cumulative measures of legislative effectiveness but not on average effectiveness.
Table 3.5 shows the differences in partisan effects of committee-agenda distance on
five measures of cumulative effectiveness: SLE scores, the number of bills introduced,
passing committee, passing the chamber, and being enacted.
Table 3.5: The Party Status Difference in Effects for Gatekeeping and Non-
gatekeeping States on Measures of Cumulative Effectiveness
DV Gatekeeping Min−Maj 95% C.I.
SLE Scores
× −.249 [-.509, .011]
X −.722∗∗∗ [-.992, -.451]
Introductions
× 3.484 [-2.966, 9.933]
X −6.006 [-12.717, .705]
Bills Passing Committee
× −.197 [-6.335, 5.942]
X −14.583∗∗∗ [-20.971, -8.195]
Bills Passing Chamber
× −.090 [-2.533, 2.352]
X −6.584∗∗∗ [-9.126, -4.042]
Bills Becoming Law
× −.384 [-2.362, 1.593]
X −5.301∗∗∗ [-7.359, -3.243]
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
NOTE: The differences are based on coefficients from hierarchical linear models with random
intercepts for chambers and represent the differences in total effects (I.e. C-A-D 0→ 1). Nega-
tive differences indicate that the effect of committee-agenda distance for majority members has
a stronger negative effect on the dependent variable than those for the minority. Hierarchical
count models with random intercepts could not be estimated due to computational requirements.
Negative differences indicate that the majority party effect is more strongly neg-
ative than that of the minority. Therefore, I expect for the difference to be more
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negative in gatekeeping states than in non-gatekeeping states (H3 ). We find that this
pattern holds across all of the cumulative effectiveness measures except the number
of introductions. The lack of a result for the number of introductions is not sur-
prising given the relative ease with which legislators can introduce bills. In all other
cases we find that the relative effect of a good match for majority members is greater
in gatekeeping states than in non-gatekeeping states. Furthermore, if we estimate
models (not shown) as rates or proportions of the same dependent variables used in
Table 3.5, we find that none of the partisan differences in the effects of committee-
agenda distance are statistically significant. This lends support to the conclusion that
H3 holds, but only for cumulative measures of effectiveness. Gatekeeping does not
condition the partisan effect of committee-agenda distance on average measures of
effectiveness.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I argued that the match between a legislator’s committee assignments
and personal policy agendas are not perfect, even though members tend to request
committees for policy reasons, and leadership tends to accommodate requests. I have
presented a novel way of measuring the distance between legislators’ committee as-
signments and policy agendas that relies on legislative activity to reveal policy areas
of particular interest to specific legislators. I further argued that the matching of com-
mittees with agendas should increase individual member’s ability to shepherd their
proposals through the legislative process. Using hierarchical random intercept mod-
els of both legislative hit rates and state legislative effectiveness scores, I have shown
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that the match does indeed matter. In fact, a decrease in committee-agenda distance
by one and a half standard deviations has a stronger positive effect on legislative
efficiency than being in the majority party (models 3.2a & 3.2b).
Legislators who find themselves on committees that match their policy interests
appear to be more effective than those who do not. By looking to the states, this
analysis was also able to leverage variation in partisan control and institutional ar-
rangements to more fully outline the relationship between the match and legislative
effectiveness. I have found that the committee-agenda match tends to benefit the
majority more than the minority, even when controlling for party identification, ide-
ological extremism, status in the chamber, and tenure. Interestingly, There appears
to be two different stories in regards to the relationship between partisan matching
and committee gatekeeping powers, depending on whether we consider average or
cumulative legislative effectiveness. For average effectiveness the presence of gate-
keeping does not condition the partisan match, but simply lowers the effect of a good
match, unconditionally. I have argued that this is the result of increasing barriers
to bill progression without corresponding barriers to introductions. For the cumula-
tive measures of effectiveness, we see a different pattern. In this case, the presence
of gatekeeping increases the effect of matching for the majority but not the minority
(Figure 3.6). In line with H3, this finding supports the argument that when a majority
member has a good match in gatekeeping states, they tend to advance more of their
proposals further than minority members with good matches. In non-gatekeeping
states, the match has similar effects on cumulative effectiveness for both minority
and majority members (Table 3.5).
This finding is important for legislative scholars because it demonstrates two key
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points. First, legislative effectiveness is not solely the result of personal characteristics
of the legislators, like many previous studies at the national-level have considered (e.g.
Volden and Wiseman 2014). Rather, legislators take advantage of their institutional
positions to ensure their proposals make it through the process. My findings have
shown that a particularly advantageous institutional position can be found at the
confluence of committee assignments, policy agendas, and party. Second, the struc-
ture of the committee system is important for legislative outcomes, at least insofar
as it contributes to the matching of committees with agendas. There is significant
variation in committee system structure across American legislatures; some more con-
ducive to matching, while others may be less so. This analysis constitutes the first
attempt to outline how and when committee systems are best-suited to producing
relevant outcomes. Significant mismatches across an entire chamber could place a
large amount of power in the hands of a small number of legislators. For this reason,
an important next step is identifying the predictors of good and bad matches, both
at the individual-level and at the institutional-level. In doing so, we might better
understand the ways in which legislative institutions condition individual behavior
and, consequently, the resulting policy outcomes.
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Chapter 4
Successful Matching of Committees
with Agendas: Individual and
Institutional Origins
4.1 Introduction
The previous section demonstrated that the match between a legislator’s committee
assignments and policy agenda has a significant effect on their ability to shepherd
their bills through the legislature. In this section, I explore the determinants of
committee-agenda matching in the state lower houses, paying specific attention to
the ways that institutional features shape the translation of legislator assets and
resources into suitable committee assignments. I argue that characteristics specific
to the legislator or their district –such as experience, party, or district diversity–
are the driving force behind committee-agenda matching but that their influence is
shaped by the institutional contexts in the chamber. Certain chambers provide more
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opportunities to turn these individual advantages (or disadvantages) into good (or
bad) committee-agenda matches.
In what follows, I identify some specific characteristics that should contribute
or detract from individual legislator’s ability to pursue committee assignments that
will match up well with their policy agenda. Specifically, I focus on three important
features: 1) legislative experience, 2) party and ideology, and 3) the diversity of po-
litically relevant interests in the district. I outline existing research that supports
these characteristics as important determinants in this regard. I, then, consider how
institutional contexts might modify the potential effects of these characteristics and
provide testable hypotheses in line with my arguments. I then test these hypotheses
by examining quantities of interest derived from mixed effects random intercepts mod-
els of committee-agenda distance. The results support my contentions that legislative
experience, party status, and the diversity of interests in the district are important
individual-level factors affecting committee-agenda matching. Furthermore, I find
that these effects are conditioned by the institutional context of the chambers. I con-
clude by tying these findings to existing theories of legislative behavior and legislative
organization.
4.2 The Legislators and Committee-Agenda Match-
ing
What kind of factors should enable legislators to better match their committee assign-
ments with their policy agendas? To answer this question we first have to acknowledge
that the match is a product of the actions, preferences, and perceptions of at least two
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actors: the member seeking assignment and the leader(s) providing them. Further-
more, this process occurs within legislative chambers, with their highly structured and
organized formal contexts and well established rules and norms. Therefore, the match
is a product of the articulation of members’ preferences, interpreted by the leadership,
and translated to assignments conditional on the leadership’s own organizational and
policy needs, all of which is shaped by the broader institutional context.
While sources of variation in committee-agenda distance can emerge from chamber
or legislator-level characteristics, the process articulated above focuses primarily on
individual factors. A precursory examination of the data supports this view. Figure
4.1 shows the distribution of committee-agenda distance across the twelve sample
lower chambers for 2011 and 2013. The figure also includes the results of variance
decomposition of committee-agenda distance. There are a few important things to
take away from Figure 4.1. First, the within chamber variance is significantly greater
than the the between chamber variance. This suggests that legislator characteristics
are driving most of the differences in committee-agenda distance.
These data comport with the view that institutional context lays out some base-
lines but that individual legislator characteristics are the primary drivers of the match.
Yet, while the between chamber variation is smaller than the within chamber varia-
tion, it is not insignificant, amounting to approximately one-third the global mean.
The relatively large differences in committee-agenda matching across individual leg-
islators should not obfuscate the very interesting cross-chamber differences that also
exist. In effect, I argue that the two cannot be considered independently. We should
expect that features, such as the number of committees, the rigidity of committee
jurisdictions, or the size of the chamber, shape the possibilities for matching for all
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Figure 4.1: Committee-Agenda Distance in the States: Individual vs. Chamber-
level Variance
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legislators. However, it should be the legislators themselves that do or do not take
advantage of the opportunities present, given the resources they bring to bear. Fur-
thermore, the institutional and organizational features of the chamber may not only
set a baseline, but also condition certain effects of individual characteristics. While,
to a large degree, an individual legislator can shape her own destiny in the chamber,
the general boundaries of what is possible and the ways in which individual charac-
teristics help or hinder are established by certain broader features of the institution
itself.
It would be helpful at this point to return to our basic model of the committee
assignment process as outlined in Figure 1.1, from Chapter 1. In what follows, I
will elaborate a bit more on this model in order to identify those individual and
institutional characteristics that should alter or condition the matching of committees
with agendas. I identify three specific legislator characteristics that should shape a
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legislator’s ability to get those committee assignments most conducive to advancing
their policy agenda. The three characteristics are 1) legislative experience, 2) party
status and ideology, and 3) the diversity of interests in the district. In each case, I
will outline an argument for the feature’s influence based on existing theoretical and
empirical findings and identify ways in which we might expect for these effects to vary
across chambers.
4.2.1 Tenure and Legislative Experience
No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright
intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the
subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be
acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men
in private as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained,
or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which
requires the use of it.
- James Madison, Federalist #53
In the above quote, and arguing against annual elections for the House of Rep-
resentatives, Madison draws on the value of experience in the process of lawmaking
to make his case for more lengthy terms of service. Legislative scholars have long ac-
knowledged that experience, or what Miquel and Snyder (2006) call learning-by-doing,
is fundamental to the development of an effective lawmaking body (e.g., Hyneman
1938; Fenno 1962; Keefe and Ogul 1968; Bell and Price 1975; Squire 1992; DeGregorio
1997; Kousser 2005; Miquel and Snyder 2006). In this chapter, I integrate the insights
from this strain of research to understand how legislative experience can condition
the individual committee-agenda matches of lower chamber members in the states. I
argue that experience not only provides the member with constituency, chamber, and
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policy specific knowledge that helps them make better committee requests given their
agendas, but also that experience makes members more prime candidates for request
accommodation by the leadership. I demonstrate that more experienced legislators
do tend to have better committee-agenda matches and also that this effect varies
predictably across relevant chamber-specific institutional arrangements.
While anecdotes, studies of the effects of aggregate turnover, and assessments of
the impact of term limits abound, the empirical findings related to individual effects
of legislative experience are much less abundant. The theories, however, for effects
at the chamber- or state-level are usually simple aggregations of individual effects
and, thus, provide a bedrock for the argument in this chapter for the sharpening of
member request criteria with experience. In addition, because the match is produced
through a process involving at least two actors, I consider how member experience
might impact accommodation by the leadership. I present a novel argument for the
positive effects of member experience, in this regard, that is based on the logic of
uncertainty aversion (Ellsberg 1961). Furthermore, I explore the ways in which term
limit reforms alter the influence of experience on the committee-agenda match.
While the U.S. House relies heavily on seniority in the assignment of committees,
this is more uncommon in the states. The lack of formal rules favoring veteran
members, however, should not completely eliminate effects of tenure and experience
on matching committee assignments with personal legislative agendas. There are
several reasons to expect that more experienced legislators will have assignments
more in line with those policies they are interested in.
First, with tenure, legislators gain experiential knowledge that should make them
more capable of effectively matching their committees to their agendas. Legislators
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need to have a good understanding of the interests in their constituency, as well as the
relative salience of these interests, in order to effectively match. It could take some
time for legislators to develop a good sense of those issues most important to their
constituents. Furthermore, they must also understand the shape that the issue space
takes in the committee system, in order to effectively map their agendas to it. For
example, a freshman legislator from an agriculturally dominant district may think
that the Agriculture committee should be her top target for membership. However,
she may come to discover that most of the bills relevant to her constituents actually
end up in the Environmental or Natural Resources committees. Experience in the
chamber, or what Miquel and Snyder (2006) call “learning-by-doing,” should be the
most effective way for legislators to build up an understanding of the committees
and how they relate to their agendas. In fact, Miquel and Snyder (2006) find that
tenure has a consistent positive effect on subjective perceptions of individual legislator
effectiveness, which they are able to attribute directly to experiential learning. It is
conceivable that this effect is, at least in part, the result of a better position within
the committee system. There is some more direct evidence for the connection between
experience and assignments in the U.S. House, where Frisch and Kelly (2004) find
that first-term members make many more assignment requests than incumbents (p.
98). This could indicate that experienced legislators are more certain about the
utility of specific committee assignments in pursuing their agendas than new members.
However, because of strict seniority norms in the U.S. House, this finding could also
indicate increased uncertainty in appointments for first-term members. Testing these
contentions in chambers without seniority norms should shed further light on these
findings.
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Second, there may be incentives for leadership to favor more experienced legisla-
tors in the assignment process even when seniority norms are not present. Because
the leadership has had the opportunity to observe and get to know experienced mem-
bers, there should be significantly less uncertainty about the goals and abilities of
these veteran members than those of freshman. From the informational perspec-
tive of legislative organization (Krehbiel 1991), we should expect for this reduced
uncertainty to make these veteran members better informational surrogates for the
chamber because the chamber can be more confident in their specialized abilities or
knowledge. In fact, Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991, p. 94) remark that it is prob-
ably for this reason that leaders in the U.S. House rarely assign freshman members
to important committees. From both the Procedural Cartel perspective (Cox and
McCubbins 1993, 2005) and the Conditional Party Government perspective (Rohde
1991; Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000), leadership should favor majority members with
experience when making committee assignments because leaders are more confident
about these members’ partisan and ideological credentials than members with little
to no experience in the chamber.
Although research on the effects of tenure on committee assignment in cham-
bers without strict seniority norms is quite scant, scholars examining the California
legislature found that tenure was a significant indicator of assignment to the more
prestigious committees (Robeck 1971; Sokolow and Brandsma 1971). Francis (1989),
however, in reporting the results of his cross-state survey, showed that first term
members seem only marginally less pleased by their assignments than veteran mem-
bers. While this finding may appear to run counter to my argument, because it is
based on subjective evaluations of legislator assignments, it could simply result from
95
freshman not having a solid standard by which to judge their committee assignments,
the lack of experience in committees to evaluate their value, or a reluctance to crit-
icize the leadership. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, reported satisfaction
with assignments is not the same thing as a good match between assignments and
agendas because this satisfaction is tempered by expectations. Similarly, Rohde and
Shepsle (1973) argue that their data from the U.S. House shows that ”the probabil-
ity of success [in being assigned to a requested committee] decrease[s] as seniority
increase[s] (905).” However, as discussed previously, assignment requests are strate-
gic, and junior members might face significantly different considerations than more
senior members. Specifically, we should expect junior members to be more reluctant
requesters of high-demand assignments because of their low chances of success. More
senior members should feel more secure in their position in the chamber and, thus,
more willing to risk failure for the opportunity to secure a plush committee role.
Therefore, the same strategic considerations that make request success a poor
measure of the match between assignments and agendas (see chapter 2) also exerts
different pressures on junior and senior members in terms of their request behavior.
Part of the argument made here is that by relying on a measure that is not influenced
by member expectations and strategic considerations, we can better understand the
ways that legislative experience influences how members connect their policy interests
with the business of being a lawmaker. In Figure 4.2, I replicate the simple model of
committee assignments from Figure 1.1, adding the influences related to experiences
discussed, here.
We can make an initial assessment of the tenure argument by examining the
bivariate relationship between committee-agenda distance and legislative experience
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in Figure 4.2. The figure supports the contention that the match improves with
tenure. The bivariate linear coefficient is negative and significant at the α = .05 level.
Due to the lack of controls and appropriate model specification, however, we should
not take Figure 4.2 as conclusive evidence but, rather, only as an encouraging signal.
Figure 4.2: Committee-Agenda Distance Across the Range of Tenure:
2011 & 2013 Sessions
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Given the argument above and the initial support presented in Figure 4.2, I con-
tend that members with experience with the organization of the chamber, as well as
the legislative process are more capable of making requests in line with their agenda
and that leaders also have more certainty about those members with experience be-
cause they have had more opportunity to observe and interact with them. Based
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on this, my first hypothesis related to tenure is the straight-forward contention that
more terms of service in the chamber should improve the committee-agenda match:
H1a: All things equal, legislators with more terms of service in the cham-
ber will have better committee-agenda matches than those with less.
This hypothesis posits that as members gain experience they also gain better commit-
tee assignments given their agenda. Yet this might not be the most accurate picture
of the effects of tenure. For one thing, while the relationship in Figure 4.2 is statisti-
cally significant, the effect is quite substantively small. In fact, the estimated effect
of one added year of tenure is only slightly larger that one-eightieth of a standard
deviation increase in Committee-Agenda Distance. Given this bivariate estimate, an
increase from no experience to the mean level of tenure (5.2 years) would correspond
to a decrease in the distance of only about one-fourteenth of its standard deviation.
I contend that tenure should have a more substantively significant effect than that
revealed by this simple bivariate measure. A lack of controls1, or failure to appropri-
ately model the data2, could be part of what is obscuring more substantive tenure
effects, but it is more likely that the effects are not simply linear and that they might
vary by certain state characteristics.
In addition to the small substantive bivariate effects revealed by Figure 4.2, we
also observe uneven decreases in the average committee-agenda distance by legislative
tenure, as seen in Table 4.1. While there does seem to be a general decreasing trend
in C-A distance, the expectation of a linear effect seems particularly unrealistic.
1 For example, legislative leaders, themselves, should display trends that run counter to those
revealed in Figure 4.2, because they tend to be 1) more experienced than the average legislator and
2) have poorer committee-agenda matches. Leaders in many chambers do not receive any explicit
committee assignments and, therefore, tend to have larger C-D Distances.
2Specifically, the OLS coefficient in Figure 4.2 does not account for the nested nature of the data
generating process.
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Table 4.1: Average Committee Agenda Distance by The Number
of Terms Severed in the Chamber: All Sample Chambers, 2011-
2013
Term(s)
Served
Average C-A
Distance
SE N 95% C.I.
0 .383 (.009) 802 [.365, .400]
1 .348 (.010) 543 [.328, .368]
2 .307 (.011) 362 [.285, .329]
3 .322 (.014) 251 [.295, .350]
4 .306 (.016) 203 [.276, .337]
5 .283 (.017) 133 [.250, .317]
6 .326 (.025) 75 [.275, .377]
7 .333 (.028) 61 [.279, .387]
8 .352 (.034) 57 [.287, .418]
9 .324 (.035) 47 [.252, .395]
10+ .260 (.018) 122 [.227, .293]
NOTE: Table entries exclude leadership of both parties.
If the effect of tenure is functioning through experience and knowledge, then we
might also expect for these effects to be front-loaded. Specifically, legislators should
gain a significant advantage after their first or second terms in office, followed by
decreasing advantages from subsequent terms. If members learn by doing, once they
map the working policy space in the chamber to their agendas, additional experience
may do them little good in regard to their assignments (Parker and Parker 2009,
326). From the leadership’s perspective, they may learn all they need to know about
a member in their first term, making subsequent terms of service superfluous in this
regard. From these insights, I develop the expectation that tenure effects will be
concentrated at the early stages.
H1b: All things equal, incumbent legislators will have better committee-
agenda matches than first term legislators.
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While the expectation is that the effects will be concentrated in early stages, I
do not have specific expectations regarding the stages at which the effect fades. In
other words, I take it as an empirical question as to at what point in legislative tenure
members fail to improve on their match in subsequent terms. In the analysis that
follows, I test the effects up to five terms, finally settling on models specifying only
three. The reasoning behind these decisions is fully outlined below. While there are
good reasons to expect non-linear effects for tenure, as mentioned above, there are
also other compelling reasons to think about the conditional effects we may see across
chambers.
The obvious feature of American state legislatures that should condition the effects
of tenure is the presence of term limits. While term limits alter legislators’ time
horizons, giving them less time to accomplish their goals (Kousser 2005; Carey et al.
2006; Sarbaugh-Thompson et al. 2006; Swift and VanderMolen 2016), they do not
appear to alter their ambitions (Carey et al. 2006; Herrick and Thomas 2005). In
these contexts, tenure becomes less meaningful, as it is necessarily restricted to only
a handful of terms. Furthermore, not only is the gap between the experienced and
inexperienced much smaller, but the comparative number of inexperienced legislators
should be much larger. In turn, more freshmen in term limit states are likely to get
good matches simply because they constitute a greater relative proportion than in
non-term limited states. In other words, there should be significantly less cross-tenure
competition for assignments in states with term limits. Although these considerations
should not completely negate the benefits of experience, it certainly makes tenure a
less appealing heuristic for leaders to use in the assignment process.
Figure 4.3 replicates Figure 4.2, but separates term limited chambers from those
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without term limits. The figure provides support for the contention that term limits
condition the effects of tenure on C-A distance; it reveals a statistically significant
negative bivariate relationship in chambers without limits and not discernible effects
in those states with them.
Figure 4.3: Committee-Agenda Distance Across the Range of Tenure
for Term Limited and Non-Term Limited Sample Chambers: 2011 &
2013 Sessions
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NOTE: Leadership is excluded from the graph (see footnote 1). The slope is the
bivariate OLS coefficient.
Given what we know about term limits and the simple bivariate relationship pre-
sented in Figure 4.3, I expect for the effects of tenure on the committee-agenda match
to be significantly muted in states that have term limits compared to those that do
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not:
H1c: All things equal, the positive effects of tenure on committee-agenda
matching are stronger in states without term limits than those with term
limits.
Again, however, we must consider the potential non-linear effects in this context:
H1d: All things equal, the negative effect of freshman status on committee-
agenda matching is stronger in states without term limits than those with
term limits.
Therefore, my expectations regarding tenure can be summarized as follows. More
experience in the legislature should improve legislators’ ability to recognize good
assignments, as well as those policy areas most important to their constituencies.
Leaders should also favor experienced members in the assignment process because
there is less uncertainty about their loyalty, capabilities, and knowledge. Second, the
effect of tenure on matching should be concentrated at the early stages of experiences.
For example, I might expect for legislators to improve their matches significantly after
their first term, but not necessarily as much or at all after their fourth term, as they
have already amassed most of the benefits of experience. Finally, I expect for the
effects of tenure to be conditioned by the presence of term limits. Because term
limits restrict the tenure that members can have, tenure should be less of a factor in
these states than in those that do not have limits.
4.2.2 Majority Party Status
Members of the majority usually control the assignment process either directly through
the majority leadership, through their numerical advantage on the floor, or in the
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Committees on Committees.The degree of majority party control over assignments
may vary by state based on rules, but they should almost always have discretion in
committee assignments, at least at the margins. In reference to this discretion in the
U.S House, Cox and McCubbins (1993) write:
The assignment process seems to us inherently discretionary. This discre-
tion, moreover, is consequential in that it provides a route by which the
collective goals of the party, as internalized by the party leadership, are
represented in the composition of committees (175).
Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that the parties–both majority and minority–
will structure their appointments in order to advance their collective goals (see chap-
ters 8 and 9, specifically). Yet, unlike in the U.S. House, in most states, the majority
leadership has much more relative discretion because seniority norms are rare, and
minority party influence in the process tends to be minimal or non-existent. For ex-
ample, of the 12 sample chambers in this analysis, five put the assignment authority
completely in the hands of the speaker, in three states the minority leader assigns
minority members, with the remainder either using a Committee on Committees or
requiring a chamber-wide vote to approve the assignments of the Speaker (see Table
1.3). In all, the assignment process in the states tends to be much more consolidated
in the hands of the majority party leadership than in Congress.
Yet, this significant relative advantage in the committee assignment process for
the majority party leadership in the states does not necessarily imply an advantage in
actual assignments for majority members. However, majority leadership face several
important incentives that encourage them to favor their co-partisans when making
assignments. First, in order to protect and potentially increase the advantage they
have in the chamber, majority leaders should prefer co-partisans for sought-after as-
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signments. Good assignments provide members with an “electoral subsidy” (Grimmer
and Powell 2013) that helps them get re-elected, by providing them with opportunities
to credit claim (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Adler and
Lapinski 1997; Broockman and Butler 2015), steer pork to their districts (Stewart and
Groseclose 1999), and amass interest group campaign funds (Grier and Munger 1991,
1993; Milyo 1994; Romer and Snyder 1994; Dow, Endersby, and Menifield 1998).
While scholars have had difficulty in demonstrating that electorally vulnerable legis-
lators are more likely to get good committee assignments (see discussion in Chapter
1), there has been more success in demonstrating that good committee assignments
produce an electoral benefit in subsequent elections (e.g., Shepsle 1978; Smith and
Deering 1983; Katz and Sala 1996; Maltzman 1997; Crain and Sullivan 1997; Milyo
1997, and Grimmer and Powell 2013).
Majority party leadership should also favor majority members in committee as-
signments, in order to exert control over the legislative process. Procedural Cartel
Theory argues that the committees are agents of the majority party, granting them
procedural control of the legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994, 2005;
Hedlund et al. 2011). Cox and McCubbins (2005) present a model of U.S. House
organization that emphasizes the ability of the majority to monopolize the agenda
by controlling certain positions in the chamber with “agenda powers.” Therefore, we
should expect for majority leaders to favor co-partisans in committee assignments if
members are likely to do what their leaders want and if the committees exert some
control over the agenda. In the states, leaders are also sensitive to the way committee
assignments provide partisan advantage in the chamber. Ralph Wright, the former
Democratic speaker of the Vermont House (1985-1995), in describing the assignment
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process, articulated a clear tendency to be cognizant of partisan control:
The committee request forms had been distributed on a Thursday morn-
ing, and I had the lot of them to take home for the weekend, to begin the
process of not just satisfying all 149 members but taking care to create
committees that would actually function–function in accordance with a
Democratic agenda (Wright 2005, 106 emphasis added).
Majority leaders are, therefore, incentivized to assign members with similar pref-
erences to their own or the party caucus, so as to better pursue the policies desired by
the majority. In other words, leadership should stack committees with members that
are representative of the party and, therefore, more inclined to use their positions to
promote the party’s preferred policies. In fact, we find significant empirical support
for this claim; ideological outliers are confined to a small set of committees in the
U.S House (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Maltzman and Smith 1994, Maltzman 1997;
Campbell 2001) and are even rarer in the states (Aldrich and Battista 2002; Overby
and Kazee 2000; Overby, Kazee, and Prince 2004).
The effectiveness of the majority party’s control over the agenda is in large part
a function of the party loyalty of pivotal committee members. Because assignments
are a valued resource among legislators, the majority party leadership can use them
to encourage members to tow the party line. Scholars have examined this proposition
from two different angles. First, loyal party members are rewarded with committee
assignments; therefore, we see the most valuable committee spots going to the most
loyal party members (see Rohde and Shepsle 1973; Smith and Ray 1983; Smith and
Deering 1984; Rohde 1991; Leighton and Lopez 2002). From this perspective, assign-
ments are a function of loyalty. As Smith and Deering (1983) report, it was common
for U.S House Speaker Tip O’Neill to incorporate “leadership support scores” into
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the process of committee transfers (242). Rohde (1991) further recounts a senior
member of the House majority as reporting that “committee assignments, especially
on exclusive committees, very definitely get more favorable consideration when you
have voted with the leadership(348).”
The second perspective argues that leadership compels loyalty from members using
valuable assignments and threats of removal or transfer (Crook and Hibbing 1985;
Coker and Crain 1994; Kanthak 2004, 2009 ). These two perspectives are related and
quite difficult to untangle. Yet, the clear difference is that these scholars contend that
party loyalty, especially in terms of voting, is partially a function of the quality of your
committee assignments. Kanthak is perhaps the best expositor of this thesis, showing
that members who receive certain plush assignments tend to alter their behavior,
demonstrating voting patterns more in line with their party’s median legislator in
both the U.S House (2004) and across a sample of five states (2009). Again, Rohde’s
(1991) interviews also provide some further evidence for this perspective. He reports
that when Speaker O’Neill warned new members against aligning themselves “with
the so-called ’Boll Weevils”’ (Conservative Southern Democrats), it was clear that
“those who expected...to get some more favorable committee consideration, probably
had to change somewhat their voting patterns (348).”
Regardless of how you conceive of this proposition, the connection between party
loyalty and committee assignments makes it very unlikely that the majority leader-
ship would preference a member of the minority over a member of their own party.
Even centrist members of the opposing party, who resemble the majority in their
policy preferences, are unlikely to get more favorable assignments than their majority
party counterparts simply because it would undermine the effectiveness of committee
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Table 4.2: Satisfaction with Committee Assignments Among State Legis-
lators by Party Status (1981)
Satisfaction with Assignments
Pleased Neither Displeased Total
Majority Party 1108 141 26 1275
86.9% 11.1% 2.0% 100.0%
Minority Party 549 141 20 710
77.3% 19.9% 2.8% 100.0%
Total 1657 282 46 1985
83.5% 14.2% 2.3% 100.0%
Note: Pearson’s χ2 = 31.06, p < .001.
Source: Francis (1981), ICPSR Study #8389.
assignments as a tool of party control. We can examine the partisan results of legis-
lator surveys on satisfaction with committee assignments for an initial evaluation of
this premise. In Table 4.2, I present the results of a survey of state legislators across
all 50 states, conducted by Francis in 1981.
As Francis (1981) points out and Table 4.2 indicates, there is a significant amount
of satisfaction with committee assignments across parties. In total, 83.5% of respon-
dents reported being pleased with their assignments. Even for the minority party,
more than three-quarters of the respondents reported being pleased. However, even
with this overwhelming satisfaction, there are still statistically significant differences
across party status. We find that minority members are almost twice as likely to
report being neither pleased nor displeased and a third more likely to be displeased
with their assignments than majority members. Although the party differences in
Table 4.2 are quite small, it is possible that respondents to this elite survey were
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somewhat reluctant to criticize the Speaker, albeit indirectly, by expressing displea-
sure with their assignments. The apparent satisfaction could also be the result of of
discounting based on expectations. Minority members may not expect to get very
good assignments, and so they report being “pleased” even if their committees do not
match up very well with their agenda. Anecdotal evidence does suggest that mem-
bers do express somewhat stronger levels of dissatisfaction with their assignments on
a regular basis. As the former speaker of the Vermont House noted regarding the
assignment process:
I really disliked making committee assignments. It seemed no matter what
I did, I couldn’t avoid having 30 or more members furious at me because
they had been “dumped” into committees on which they didn’t want to
serve (Wright 2005, 105).
The results of Francis’ survey can be difficult to reconcile with statements like these.
For example, in Wright’s state of Vermont, the survey yielded unanimous satisfaction
(“Pleased”) with assignments across both parties for 1981. Regardless, the partisan
differences in Table 4.2 provide some moderate support for the premise advanced
here, that majority members are more likely to achieve better matches.
In effect, being a member of the majority should strongly impact chances of re-
ceiving quality assignments in the states because the process tends to be more solidly
in the hands of the majority leadership than at the federal level. Furthermore, ma-
jority leaders have several incentives to favor their co-partisans over the opposition,
including creating electoral conditions more favorable to the party, greater confluence
of policy goals and priorities, and the ability to use assignments as leverage against
defection by members of your own party. All of these considerations lead me to ar-
gue that majority members should fare better than the minority in matching their
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committee assignments to their policy agenda:
H2a: All things equal, majority party members will be more likely to have
better committee-agenda matches than minority party members.
As previously mentioned, however, the relative benefit of committee assignments
for the majority is, in large part, a function of committee utility or value in the leg-
islative process. If the committees have control over the agenda through the ability to
kill bills (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kanthak 2009), then they are central to policy
outcomes and should have significant value. In this case, members of the majority
have strong incentives to pursue good assignments (as does the minority), and the
leadership has more incentives to ensure an advantage in committee assignments for
the majority party granting them procedural control. However, in the absence of
committees with agenda control, there may be fewer incentives for majority members
or leadership to put in the effort to dominate the committee system. Although com-
mittees still have significant credit-claiming value, their value in terms of procedural
control is greatly reduced, and, thus, they become less effective tools to induce party
loyalty.
Therefore, we should expect for the marginal benefit to the majority in terms
of committee-agenda matching to primarily be concentrated in those chambers with
powerful committees, if the partisan incentives are operating through the need for
procedural control. Although we might expect for weak committees to simply reduce
the the committee-agenda match uniformly across the chamber, this would be a mis-
take. While all legislators might be dissuaded from pursuing a good match in the
presence of weak committees, the combination of strong committees with majority
control of the assignment process should restrict most of the effects of committee
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strength to the majority party (Kanthak 2009). Given these insights, I expect that
majority members will have a greater advantage in the match over the minority in
those chambers that have committees with agenda control:
H2b: All things equal, in those chambers where committees have control
over the agenda, majority party members will be more likely to have better
committee-agenda matches than minority party members.
Institutional variation may not be the only source of conditioning in the partisan
effects on committee-agenda matching. The existing literature also points us towards
another crucial factor in shaping this partisan advantage. The Conditional Party
Government thesis (Rohde 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000) contends that the
majority’s ability to control the policy process is determined largely by its internal
ideological homogeneity.3 When the party is homogeneous, members are comfortable
with strong leadership and the leaders are more willing to accommodate co-partisan
requests, as they expect their co-partisan to be active in advancing the party’s pri-
orities. When the majority is ideologically heterogeneous, there can be a significant
amount of uncertainty in whether co-partisans will tow the party line (Aldrich and
Rohde 2000). Therefore, I expect for majority members to have a greater advan-
tage in the committee-agenda match when the majority party is more ideologically
homogeneous:
H2c: All things equal, in those chambers where the majority is more
ideologically homogeneous, majority party members should be more likely
to have better committee-agenda matches than minority party members.
In total, I expect for majority members to have better matches because the ma-
jority leader has the power and incentives to favor her own party over the opposition.
3Rohde (1991) identifies other conditions as well, including institutional forms of leverage and a
leadership willing to use them.
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Additionally, the effects of majority party status should be quite significant but might
be isolated to only certain chambers where the conditions make for strong party con-
trol. Specifically, those chambers that give the committees negative agenda power
and where the majority is homogeneous, should provide leadership with significant
incentives to consolidate good assignments in the hands of the majority.
4.2.3 Diversity of Interests in the District
To this point, I have considered individual characteristics of members as contributing
to their match. In this section, I consider district-level characteristics and how they
might impact a member’s match between his/her committees and agenda. Specifi-
cally, I consider the effects of district diversity on interests or priorities and how it
may make the representational role of members more difficult, especially in terms of
committee assignments. The basis of the argument made in this section is that when
a district is composed of various interested parties that may not only have differing
opinions, but more importantly differing priorities, we should expect for legislators
representing those districts to have problems accommodating those various priorities
with their committee assignments. Because legislators within a chamber generally
all receive a similar number of assignments, when a legislator’s agenda is particularly
broad, they may have relative difficulty getting committee representation for all of
the issues that are important to them and their constituents. Here, I am considering
the diversity of the constituency to represent the breadth of the public agenda in
the district. The early literature on the effects of district diversity examined how it
impacted electoral competition, primarily in U.S House elections. Initial attempts
to identify the relationship between the two were unsuccessful (Fenno, 1974; Bond,
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1983) largely because of the measures of diversity used (Koetzle, 1998). Koetzle
(1998), using a measure of diversity that accounted for the partisan nature of some
demographic groups, did find that more diverse House districts do experience higher
levels of electoral competition.
Additionally, a more contemporary set of works has considered the effects of ide-
ologically heterogeneous districts on the behavior of legislators. These scholars have
found that states and districts with more diverse political preferences tend to produce
more partisan (Baily and Brady 1998; Bishin, Dow, and Adams, 2005) and ideolog-
ically extreme (Harden and Carsey, 2012; Ensley 2012) legislators, as well as more
polarized parties (Kirkland 2014). When legislators emerge from these more hetero-
geneous contexts, constituency cues are less clear, and, therefore, they tend to rely
more on party. As Bishin, Dow, and Adams (2005) put it:
[T]he diversity of citizens’ opinions may mediate the quality of represen-
tation they receive. The strength of the message constituents transmit
to legislators when they are unified in their preferences is quite different
from the strength of the message sent when they are divided (202).
Yet, as previously mentioned, the focus here is on priorities and not preferences,
so previous examinations of ideological diversity may not be that informative for
my purposes. A state or district can be ideologically diverse, with that diversity of
opinion consolidated on a few important and salient issues. In considering the effects
on legislators’ agendas, we are interested in the breadth of constituent priorities, as
opposed to their degree of agreement. Ensley, Tofias, and Marchi (2009) perhaps come
closer with their measure of complexity, which considers the dimensionality of the
policy space as a function of the distribution of preferences.4 While the step towards
4While Ensley, Tofias, and Marchi (2009) do have a serious theoretical treatment of dimension-
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looking to breadth as opposed to only variance certainly approaches the concept I am
concerned with, it still fails by focusing on preferences. Because, the dimensionality of
preferences is frequently reducible in ways (i.e., along party or ideological lines) that
priorities are not, measures like these are still likely to underestimate the breadth of
issue priorities in many places.
The signal that legislators receive from their constituents could be muddled by
diversity of preferences, as argued by Bishin, Dow, and Adams (2005), but it could
also be muddled by the plurality of priorities expressed. Legislators facing broad
constituency agendas not only face the problem of limited assignments, but also the
more complex task of correctly interpreting the priorities signaled to them by vot-
ers. They may know that five specific issues are very important in the district, but
they may not know which to prioritize for committee assignment. As the number
of important issues increases, this problem for members should also increase. Thus,
because assignments are in limited supply and because broad agendas are more diffi-
culty communicated, I expect for legislators elected out of districts with more diverse
interests to have more difficulty matching:
H3a: All things equal, legislators elected from districts with more diversity
of interests will have poorer committee-agenda matches than those coming
from more homogeneous ones.
Although diversity of interest should pose some problems for most legislators, it
is possible that some are capable of mitigating these difficulties in an important way.
While the tendency is for most members to receive the similar number of assignments
within chambers, there are outliers in this regard. Figure 4.4 presents the distribution
ality, they do not consider the dimensionality of preferences directly in their measure of complexity,
but rather the correlation between two recovered factors from a principle component factor analysis
of preferences (994). In effect, they assume the dimensionality to be equal to two.
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of committee assignments across legislators by chamber for the 12 sample states.
In eight of the 12 chambers, a majority of members receive the same number of
assignments. In the other four chambers (Alaska, Caliufornia, Illinois, and Michigan),
we find more variation in the number of assignments legislators receive.
Figure 4.4: The Number of Committee Assignments for Legislators in the
Sample Chambers: 2011
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Even in those chambers where most legislators get the same number of assign-
ments, there are always some outliers on the higher end. This indicates that in every
chamber some legislators have the opportunity to obtain more assignments than the
average member. This potential should be of particular concern for those members
from diverse districts, as they face pressures to be active on more issues. Therefore,
I expect for the number of committee assignments a legislator receives to mitigate
some of the difficulties faced by legislators from diverse districts in getting a good
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match:
H3b: All things equal, the negative effect of district diversity of interests
on committee-agenda matching should be lessened for legislators receiving
more assignments.
In total, I expect for legislators who are elected from districts that are more di-
verse in term of the policy priorities of the constituency to have more difficulties in
matching their assignments to their agendas for two reasons. First, with more prior-
ities, legislators would require more assignments to accommodate a match. Second,
when a large number of agenda priorities are being communicated to a legislator, it is
more difficult for that legislator to correctly interpret the entirety of those priorities
than if there were fewer. While these considerations should make the match more
difficult to achieve, both can be mitigated by an industrious legislator who gains ad-
ditional committee assignments. Therefore, I expect for those members with more
assignments to face less of a potential penalty from district diversity than those who
do not.
4.3 Data & Methods
To assess the above hypotheses, I turn to the same state data utilized in the previous
chapter. Since we are concerned with understanding the predictors of the committee-
agenda match, I use the Committee-Agenda Distance as my dependent variable. The
primary independent variables of concern are legislative tenure, majority party sta-
tus, and district diversity of interests. The first two measures have already been
introduced in the previous chapter, but the measure of district diversity is new and
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is discussed at length in Appendix A. In addition, I also include those variables
expected to condition the primary independent variables in my analysis. These in-
clude the presence of legislative term limits, intra-party cohesion, the presence of
gatekeeping powers, and the number of committee assignments a legislator receives.
Additionally, I include various control variables measuring individual legislator char-
acteristics (e.g., leadership positions, party, ideological extremism, etc.), as well as
chamber characteristics (e.g. committee assignment and jurisdiction rules, legislative
professionalization, advancement prospects, etc.).
Because I have specific expectations regarding the appropriate functional form for
the tenure variable(s), I rely on linear, cubic polynomial, and dichotomous specifica-
tions of tenure to assess the complexities in this regard. My measure of party status
is the same as in the previous chapter (majority vs. minority), and I also include a
dichotomous indicator identifying Democrats. For the ideological measures of intra-
party cohesion and ideological extremism, I rely on the Shor and McCarty (2011)
data. Intra-party cohesion is measured as the within party standard deviations of the
scaled ideology scores.
In order to measure the diversity of interests in state legislative districts, I rely
on spatially aggregated Census data made available by The National Historical Ge-
ographic Information System (NHGIS). NHGIS aggregates large amounts of data to
specific geographies, including state legislative districts. Using these data, I construct
a measure of interest diversity based on five demographic variables: race/ethnicity,
language, industry of employment, income group, and education group. I chose these
demographics because, of those broadly available, they represent groups most likely
to attach to particular political issues. In Appendix A, I specifically outline the
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construction of this measure and argue, that due to its evenness (Hill 1973), it is
superior to many previously used measures of diversity. District diversity of interests
is measured as follows:
qDV =
∑V
j=1
[
(
∑sj
i=1 p
q
ji)
1/(1−q)
]
∑V
j=1 sj
(4.1)
Where j indexed the separate variables and i indexes the variable categories; V is
the total number of variables, while sj is the number of categories for variable j; pji
is the proportion of the population falling into category i for variable j. The value
q is often referred to as the “order” of diversity, and it determines the measure’s
sensitivity to more or less relatively abundant categories, where q > 0 favors more
abundant categories, q < 0 favors the less abundant categories, and when q = 0, the
relative abundances are ignored entirely.5
I control for various individual factors, including the legislator’s ideological ex-
tremism, which I expect to increase committee-agenda distance as members become
more ideologically distant from the median legislator. I also control for leadership and
committee chair positions, where I expect both to decrease the committee-agenda
match. Additionally, I include a series of chamber-level controls. I expect for the
number of committees, the level of professionalization, strict committee jurisdictions
(Anzia and Jackman 2012)6, and prospects for advancement (Squire 1988) to all im-
prove the chances for a match and, thus, reduce the distance. The size of the chamber
in seats is expected to reduce chances for matching, as larger chambers tend to provide
fewer assignments to their members.
5see Table A.1 for a more specific account of q.
6Strict committee jurisdictions are found in those chambers where the rules require bills be
referred to committee(s) with the appropriate jurisdiction(s).
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As with the previous chapter, I am testing the effects of both individual and
chamber-level variables on an individual-level outcome. My legislative data are nested
in state chambers, and, thus, I make use of hierarchical models with random-intercepts
for each chamber. Although several tables will only present the primary variables of
concern, all models represented in the tables include all the control variables.
4.4 Results
I begin the analysis by presenting the complete additive model of committee agenda
distance in Table 4.3. I begin by specifying tenure with three dichotomous indicators
for the first three terms of service, where the comparison category would be that
of four or more sessions. I find that compared to those members with four or more
terms of service, those in their first term see a .062 increase in their committee-agenda
distance. Additionally, we see those members in their second term do far worse than
their fourth (and more) term colleagues, while improving over their first term ones.
This comports well with the expectation that experience will benefit the match and
that the benefits of experience diminish over time (H1b). We also find support for
H2a in Table 4.3. On average, majority members have committee-agenda distances of
.045 smaller than minority members. Finally, district diversity has the expected effect
on committee-agenda distance; where a one standard deviation increase in diversity
(+.057) increases the committee-agenda distance by .011.
Additionally, the controls mostly perform as expected. The number of assignments
and being a committee chair or vice chair reduced the committee-agenda distance as
expected, and the size of the chamber increased the distance as anticipated. Holding
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Committee-Agenda Distance
Model 4.3.1
Primary Predictors
1st Term .062∗∗∗ (.010)
2nd Term .025∗ (.010)
3rd Term .003 (.011)
Majority Party −.045∗∗∗ (.012)
District Diversity .201∗∗ (.070)
Conditioning Variables
Term Limits .035 (.041)
Gatekeeping .026 (.039)
Intra-party Cohesion .124∗ (.060)
# Committees −.016∗∗∗ (.004)
Controls
Extremism .008 (.008)
Democrat −.009 (.009)
Leader .176∗∗∗ (.031)
Committee Chair or Vice Chair −.056∗∗∗ (.009)
Chamber Seats .001∗ (.000)
Chamber Committees .005∗∗ (.002)
Professionalization −.061 (.120)
Strict Committee Jurisdictions −.030 (.039)
Advancement Prospects −.110 (.105)
2013 Session .009 (.009)
2015 Session .029∗∗ (.010)
Constant .124 (.091)
Error Variances:
Chamber-level .003∗∗∗ (.002)
Legislator-level .039∗∗∗ (.001)
N 3188
Chambers 12
AIC -1056.212
BIC -916.667
ll 551.106
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
a leadership position and the total number of committees, however, both increased
the distances, counter to my expectation. It is possible that leaders simply do not
need assignments, and because they frequently have less than the average member,
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their matches tend to be poorer. Having more committees may also make matching
assignments to agendas more difficult as there are more opportunities for mistakes to
arise. In all, Table 4.3 provides some general support for my hypotheses; however, in
the subsequent analysis, I will delve into each with a bit more specificity to better
evaluate my claims. I will begin by looking at the effects of tenure and legislative
experience.
4.4.1 Tenure
As mentioned previously, while I expect for tenure to improve the ability of legislators
to match their committees with their agendas, there are good reasons to believe that
experience will yield diminishing returns. In this section, I more closely examine this
possibility, as well as the potential conditional nature of the effects of tenure. In
what follows, I compare a series of different specifications in order to evaluate how
and when more experience might contribute to better matches.
Table 4.4 presents eight alternative specifications of tenure to that presented in
Table 4.3. The first model includes a linear tenure trend (Model 4.4.1) and imposes the
strictest assumptions regarding the effects of tenure. In this model, the assumption
is that tenure will have a constant and linear effect on committee-agenda distance
within and across chambers. The next two models include a squared (Model 4.4.2) and
cubed (Model 4.4.3) specification of tenure, respectively. These specifications have
been introduced to account for the potential of non-linear effects of tenure. While
the squared specification is more rigid, the cubic polynomial is particularly flexible
to a variety of nonlinear forms (Carter and Signorino 2010). The remaining five
specifications utilize dichotomous indicators for up to five terms. These are, perhaps
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Table 4.4: The Effects of Tenure: Alternative Specifications
4.4.1 4.4.2 4.4.3 4.4.4 4.4.5 4.4.6 4.4.7 4.4.8
Tenure −.008∗∗∗ −.015∗∗∗ −.042∗∗∗
(.001) (.004) (.008)
Tenure2 .001∗ .009∗∗∗
(.000) (.002)
Tenure3 −.001∗∗∗
(.000)
1st Term .052∗∗∗ .061∗∗∗ .062∗∗∗ .069∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗
(.009) (.010) (.010) (.011) (.012)
2nd Term .024∗∗ .025∗ .033∗∗ .033∗∗
(.009) (.010) (.011) (.012)
3rd Term .003 .010 .011
(.011) (.012) (.013)
4th Term .025 .026
(.014) (.014)
5th Term .003
(.015)
N 3188 3188 3188 3188 3188 3188 3188 3188
Chambers 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
AIC −1060.700 −1048.816 −1046.110 −1067.813 −1065.323 −1056.212 −1050.944 −1042.442
BIC −933.289 −915.339 −906.565 −940.403 −931.846 −916.667 −905.333 −890.763
ll 551.350 546.408 546.055 554.906 554.662 551.106 549.472 546.221
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are from a linear mixed effects model, with random
intercepts for chambers. Control variables and random effects are omitted from the table but included in
all models.
the most flexible specifications, yet I should make a note on the interpretation of the
coefficients. Models 4.4.1-4.4.3 are trend specifications of tenure whose coefficients
indicate that an increase in tenure will have a negative effect on the committee-agenda
distance. On the other hand, the dichotomous specifications provide average effects
for having a certain degree of experience in relationship to the most experienced group
(the omitted category). The sign on these coefficients are opposite those of the trend
variables as we would expect; being a first term legislator disadvantages you in terms
of the match relative to incumbent legislators; therefore, we observe positive effects
on the distance (Model 4.4.4).
To better assess the effects of tenure I produce effects graphs in Figure 4.5. Figure
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4.5A provides the estimated effects and confidence intervals for the dichotomous spec-
ification in model 4.4.8. We find that there are statistically significant effects for first
and second term legislators compared to those with six or more terms but that mem-
bers who have more than two sessions have statistically indistinguishable committee-
agenda distances from those with the most experience. This finding comports well
with my expectations for diminishing returns from tenure. Figure 4.5B shows the
marginal effects of increasing tenure by one session for the cubic polynomial model
(4.4.4). This specification also produces results consistent with diminishing returns.
Increases in tenure have a larger positive effect on the match at the early stages of a
career, but the returns from experience all but disappear after members have served
three terms.
Figure 4.5: The Effects of Tenure On Committee-Agenda Distance.
A B
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NOTE: 95% Confidence Intervals are shown. In Model 4.4.7 (A above) the excluded
category is for legislators with 5 (entering sixth term) or more consecutive terms of
service.
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In terms of model fit, we see in Table 4.4 that the most basic specification that
includes only a dichotomous indicator for first year legislators actually fits the data
best. This is perhaps unsurprising given that the point at which experience ceases
to provide benefits in terms of the match might vary significantly by chamber. If
this point varies by chamber then the only consistent finding we are likely to uncover
without specifying conditional hypotheses is that freshman are disadvantaged relative
to everyone else in the chamber. The next task, then, is to specify some models that
consider conditions that might alter the relative impact of tenure. As discussed above,
the most obvious factor that should condition experience would be the presence of
legislative term limits. In Table 4.5 I present the results of three conditional tenure
models, where I allow the coefficient on the tenure variables to vary by the presence of
legislative term limits. The first model (4.5.1) interacts the cubic polynomial of tenure
with a dichotomous indicator for term limits, while the second model 4.5.2 interacts
three dichotomous indicators–identifying legislators in their first three terms–with
term limits.
The results of the interaction models are difficult to interpret directly from the
coefficients. For this reason, I present the marginal effects of tenure for term limited
and non-term limited states in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. Figure 4.6 presents the marginal
effects for the interactive polynomial model (4.5.1). In this figure we find that the
effects of tenure for non-term limited states largely resemble those uncovered in the
additive model (Figure 4.5B), where there is a significant negative effect on the dis-
tance up until the fourth session, where the effect becomes indistinguishable from
zero. Among term limit states, the negative effect on the difference is only statisti-
cally significant up to their first term. Notice, however, the slope of the curve in the
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Table 4.5: Tenure and Committee-Agenda Distance in Term
Limited and Non-Term Limited States.
4.5.1 4.5.2
Tenure −.052∗∗∗ (.010)
Tenure2 .010∗∗∗ (.003)
Tenure3 −.001∗∗∗ (.000)
Tenure × Term Limits −.024 (.037)
Tenure2 × Term Limits .028 (.022)
Tenure3 × Term Limits −.004 (.003)
1st Term .080∗∗∗ (.012)
2nd Term .033∗ (.013)
3rd Term .017 (.015)
1st Term × Term Limits −.096∗∗ (.031)
2nd Term × Term Limits −.066∗ (.032)
3rd Term × Term Limits −.089∗∗ (.033)
Term Limits −.098 (.061) −.006 (.064)
N 3188 3188
Chambers 12 12
AIC -723.329 -748.468
BIC -659.025 -684.164
ll 372.664 385.234
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are from a linear mixed
effects model, with random intercepts for chambers. Control variables and random
effects are omitted from the table but included in all models.
term limits graph is much steeper at low levels of tenure than in the non-term limits
graph. The larger confidence intervals are most likely associated with the smaller
sample of term limited legislators. In fact, I gray out the area on the term limits
graph where tenure is greater than four because the sample only contains 30 obser-
vations that meet these criteria. Based on the polynomial interaction model, then,
I have shown that there are advantages to increased experience up to four years in
chambers without term limits, but only for the first year of experience in term limited
states.
Figure 4.7 presents the marginal effects of a legislator being in their first, second,
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Figure 4.6: Marginal Effects of Increasing Legislative Tenure by One
Session On Committee-Agenda Distance: Cubic Polynomial Specifica-
tion
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or third session, compared to those who are in their fourth or greater session of service
for both term limited and non-term limited states. What I find is that in non-term
limited states, legislators in their first and second sessions of services have statistically
poorer matches than those in their third or greater sessions. We can contrast that
with what we observe in term limited states, where there does not appear to be
any effect of being in your first two sessions, and the effects at all three stages are
statistically indistinguishable from each other. In term limited states, the effects of
experience appear muted as expected.
For both the polynomial and dichotomous tenure specifications, we find support
for the tenure hypotheses. Up to approximately the fourth session, most legislators
appear to benefit from experience when matching their committee assignments to
their agendas. We also consistently find that rookie legislators have worse matches
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Figure 4.7: Marginal Effects of Tenure Status (Dichotomous) On
Committee-Agenda Distance In Term Limited and Non-Term Limited
States
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than veterans in most contexts. Finally, the effects of tenure appear very different in
term limited states, where they are muted and less enduring. In these states, legisla-
tors may be differentiated in different terms because of the broad lack of experience,
or they are perhaps forced to compensate in alternative way for the formal lack of
tenure. Next, we turn to the analysis of the impact of majority party status on the
match.
4.4.2 Party
In terms of party status, I have argued that the majority party leadership has in-
centives to ensure that the majority is better positioned in the chamber than the
minority. This includes providing majority members with better committee assign-
ments in order to maintain party discipline and provide procedural control to the
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majority party. Table 4.3 demonstrated that, on average, being a member of the
majority party leads to a decrease of .045 in the committee-agenda distance. We
Table 4.6: The Effects of Majority Status on Committee-Agenda Distance
4.6.1 4.6.2 4.6.3
Majority Party −.111∗∗∗ −.003 .033
(.027) (.016) (.051)
Intra-party Heterogeneity .011 .170∗∗ .170
(.073) (.061) (.113)
Gatekeeping .020 .070 .087
(.038) (.041) (.069)
Majority × Heterogeneity .184∗∗ −.135
(.069) (.122)
Majority × Gatekeeping −.065∗∗∗ −.180∗∗
(.016) (.062)
Heterogeneity × Gatekeeping −.043
(.154)
Majority × Heterogeneity × Gatekeeping .359∗
(.166)
N 3188 3188 3188
Chambers 12 12 12
AIC -1057.818 -1064.228 -1058.400
BIC -912.206 -918.617 -894.587
ll 552.909 556.114 556.200
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are from a linear mixed effects model, with
random intercepts for chambers. Control variables and random effects are omitted from the table
but included in all models.
now turn to those institutional components that may condition the translation of
majority status into better matches. Table 4.6 provides the relevant estimates from
multiplicative random intercept models, where I interact party status with the degree
of intra-party heterogeneity and the presence of committee gatekeeping powers.
Model 4.6.1 includes the interaction between majority status and intra-party ide-
ological heterogeneity. From a precursory examination of the coefficients, we can see
that majority party status has a strong negative and statistically significant effect
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when there is no intra-party ideological heterogeneity. To better assess the inter-
action, Figure 4.8 graphs the marginal effects of being in the majority at different
levels of intra-party heterogeneity. The figure shows the expected relationship; when
Figure 4.8: Effects of Majority Party Status On Committee-Agenda
Distance at Different Levels of Intra-party Heterogeneity . (Model
4.6.1)
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tom of the graph, overlapping histograms shows the in-sample levels of
majority intra-party cohesion for the Republican (red) and Democratic
(blue) parties.
the majority party is relatively homogeneous, being a majority member significantly
reduces committee-agenda distance. As the majority party becomes more hetero-
geneous, the effect of majority status diminishes until, at relatively high levels of
intra-party heterogeneity–approximately the 80th percentile (.45)–the effect of ma-
jority status becomes indistinguishable from zero.
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Model 4.6.2 includes the interaction between majority status and the presence
of gatekeeping committees. Figure 4.9 shows the marginal effects of majority sta-
tus in gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping states. It shows that majority status has a
significant negative effect on the distance in gatekeeping states, as I hypothesized.
Furthermore, the effect in gatekeeping states is statistically different from that in
non-gatekeeping states, while in non-gatekeeping states the effect is indistinguishable
form zero. Again, as expected, being in the majority seems to yield benefits in terms
of the match only if committees are granted negative agenda control. In line with my
theory, majority leaders appear to have much stronger incentives to accommodate
co-partisans when committees are more powerful.
Figure 4.9: Effects of Majority Party Status On Committee-Agenda
Distance In Chambers with and without Committee Gatekeeping Pow-
ers . (Model 4.6.2)
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Finally, I consider the way in which gatekeeping and intra-party heterogeneity
condition majority status in tandem through model 4.6.3. Figure 4.10 provides the
marginal effect for the three-way interaction. The graph on the left indicates the
effects across heterogeneity for gatekeeping chambers, while the one on the right
shows it for non-gatekeeping ones. The portion of the estimated effect lines in bold
show where the confidence intervals of the two effects do not overlap. The figure
129
demonstrates that in states with gatekeeping and a homogeneous majority, majority
members reap the greatest benefits in terms of their match. Throughout the range
of intra-party heterogeneity, there is no statistically significant effect of majority sta-
tus in non-gatekeeping states, indicating that the presence of gatekeeping may be
a precursory requirement for the translation of majority status into better matches.
Finally, if the majority is heterogeneous enough, the effects of majority status will be
Figure 4.10: The Effects of Majority Party Status On Committee-
Agenda Distance at Different Levels of Intra-party Heterogeneity and
in Chambers With and Without Gatekeeping Powers. (Model 4.6.3)
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indistinguishable from zero regardless of the presence of gatekeeping.
In all, the analysis here supports my contentions regarding the effects of majority
status. Being in the majority tends to yield advantages in terms of the match, but
these advantages are conditional on two key variables. If the chamber has gatekeeping
committees, majority leadership has strong incentives to favor co-partisans in the
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assignment process. If committees do not have negative agenda control, however, this
incentive appears to drastically diminish. None of the analysis uncovers statistically
significant effects for majority status among non-gatekeeping states. Furthermore, the
benefit of being in the majority in gatekeeping states also appears to be conditioned
by the degree of intra-party ideological heterogeneity. When the majority is very
homogeneous, being a member of the majority yields strong benefits to the match.
This effect decreases as the majority becomes more ideologically diverse. I, now, turn
to the effects of broad constituency agendas in the districts.
4.4.3 Diversity of Interests
Diversity of interests in the districts should expand the public agenda among the con-
stituency, leading legislators to consider a broader range of priorities in establishing
their personal agendas. If this is the case, I expect for district with higher levels of
interest diversity to pose problems for legislators in matching their committees with
agendas. While the coefficient in Table 4.3 for diversity (with q = 3) does support
this contention, I want to begin by investigating the the proper threshold for q in the
measure of district interest diversity. Because q determines the sensitivity to minor
groups, with larger values of q weighting them less, we will examine diversity mea-
sures where I allow q to vary up to 32. This will provide measures that preference
larger groups to increasing degrees. When q = 32, the presence of the smallest of
groups will exert little to no impact on the measure of diversity. Figure 4.11 plots
the coefficients on district diversity, as well as the Akaike Information Criterion for
each model, specified as in Table 4.3, except that q varies by the values indicated on
the x-axis.
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Figure 4.11
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It appears that the measure of diversity that is particularly sensitive to small groups
(q = 2) fits the data best and also yields the largest coefficient in terms of magnitude.
This further indicates that legislators are particularly sensitive to constituency inter-
ests; relatively small constituency groups with particularized interests can make the
matching process more difficult. I now move on to considering the conditional nature
of this relationship. Specifically, can having more committee assignments mitigate
the effects of district diversity?
Table 4.7 provides the estimates from the multiplicative random intercept models
that include the interaction between district diversity and number of committee as-
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Table 4.7: The Effects of District Diversity of Interests on Committee-Agenda
Distance for Various Numbers of Committee Assignments
4.7.1 4.7.2 4.7.3
2D .297
(.168)
2D × # Coms −.023
(.051)
3D .265
(.153)
3D × # Coms −.022
(.046)
# Coms −.004 −.006 −.008
(.027) (.023) (.020)
4D .238
(.147)
4D × # Coms −.017
(.044)
Observations 3188 3188 3188
AIC −1050.576 −1050.118 −1049.542
BIC −904.965 −904.506 −903.931
ll 549.288 549.059 548.771
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are from a linear mixed effects model,
with random intercepts for chambers. Control variables and random effects are omitted from
the table but included in all models.
signments. Because the number of assignments is always above zero, interpreting the
coefficients in the interactive models is particularly fruitless. For this reason, I present
the marginal effects of district diversity at varying levels of committee assignments
in Figure 4.12.
From Figure 4.12 we see that the number of committee assignments does not pro-
duce a significant conditioning effect. None of the slopes in the figure are statistically
significant. Nevertheless, the effects at low numbers of assignments are statistically
significant and in the expected direction, while the effects for higher numbers of
assignments (4+) are indistinguishable from zero. While this is in line with my hy-
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Figure 4.12: The Marginal Effects of District Diversity on Committee-
Agenda Distance At Varying Numbers of Committee Assignments: For q
equals two to five
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potheses, the size of the confidence intervals combined with the relatively shallow
slopes in Figure 4.12 suggest that the number of assignments has only an additive
effect on the distance. Therefore, it appears as though district diversity does make
the match more difficult, but assignments do not reliably reduce this difficulty.
4.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, in my analysis, I have found support for all of the crucial individual
characteristics identified as predictors of the match. First term legislators can expect
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to see their committee-agenda distances reduced by approximately .042 in their second
terms and only .026 in their third (see Figure 4.5B). Additionally, this effect appears
mostly in states without term limits. In states with term limits, legislators can expect
a reduction in the distances after their first year only, but our certainty about the
magnitude of the reduction is quite poor (95% confident, it falls between -.146 and
-.005).
Party status also affects the match as anticipated. On average, majority party
members have committee-agenda distances of -.045 less than minority members, yet
there is a significant amount of variation in this effect across chambers. In states
with gatekeeping powers, majority members from the least heterogeneous parties
can expect their distances to be about .11 smaller than for minority members. The
magnitude of this effect reduces to zero once party heterogeneity reaches the sample’s
80th percentile value (.45). In states without gatekeeping committees, we see not
statistically different distances between majority and minority members.
District diversity of interests also appear to have the expected effect on committee-
agenda distances. An increase in district diversity of one standard deviation is asso-
ciated with an increase in the distance of .011. It appears as though those legislators
facing a broader array of priorities in their constituencies, have a harder time of
matching. I also expected for the number of assignments a legislator receives to mit-
igate some of the problems posed by diversity. The results of the analysis do not
support this contention. In none of the models did the number of assignments pro-
duce a statistically significant effect conditioning the effects of diversity. Assignments
do appear to additively reduce the committee-agenda distance, but there is no obvi-
ous interaction between assignments and diversity. It is possible that the number of
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assignments it takes to mitigate a broad constituency agenda could vary by cham-
ber. If this is the case, then the conditional estimates in the model are averaging
across effects at different numbers of assignments and could obscure a more nuanced
relationship.
The sources of the committee-agenda match emerge from both the request be-
havior of members and the accommodation behavior of leadership. In this chapter, I
have demonstrated that three individual characteristics play into one or both of these
considerations. These individual characteristics both shape the ways that members
perceive their individual agendas (tenure, district diversity) and the ways in which
leaders seek to accommodate requests and make assignments (tenure, party status).
Additionally, the context in the chamber can alter the ways in which these character-
istics contribute or detract from the match. While the individual legislators and the
resources they bring to bear are the primary sources of variation in the match, the
broader context translates these individual assets into better or worse institutional
positions for their agendas.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusions
Scholars of American legislatures generally agree that committees play a crucial role
in the legislative process. Yet, most of the research in this field has largely ignored
Fenno’s (1973) early point about members matching their their varied priorities with
their committee assignments. I have argued and shown that this match is a crucial
component of the legislative process. Further, the value of assignment to a policy com-
mittee is largely a function of this match. While some committees grant advantages
to most members (i.e., control committees), the vast majority are subject-specific
and valued for their policy jurisdictions. However, what constitutes a “good” juris-
diction will differ by members and is a function of their issue priorities. Any analysis
that seeks to understand the influence of the committee system should take into ac-
count the agendas of individual members and how their assignments stack up to those
agendas.
I began by laying out a theoretical argument that identifies policy priorities as
the source of sincere committee preferences. For individual members, assignment
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to policy committees can address their important goals of enacting policy and re-
election. If they obtain those committee assignments that match their policy priorities
they will have more opportunities to pursue them, while assignments reflective of
constituency agendas could help to ensure re-election. In other words, members
want to be on policy committees that conform to their policy priorities or those of
their constituents. Assignment, however, is not entirely up to individual members.
Leadership plays a crucial role in devising the distribution of assignments. Following
the extensive existing literature, I have argued that leaders tend to accommodate
member requests in the assignment process in order to appease and, perhaps, control
the membership. If members use agendas as the base for their requests, and leaders
generally accommodate those requests, then we should expect for assignments to
reflect policy agendas. There are, however, several opportunities for the introduction
of “error” into the translation of priorities to assignment.
Figure 5.1 presents the basic model of assignments with those influences that can
contribute to the mis-matching of assignments with agendas. I identified four main
components that hurt the translation process. Two influences work on members and
alter the translation of agendas into requests. First, assignment expectations (a)
introduce strategic considerations into the development of request. Members might
not request their most preferred committee because they are unlikely to be assigned
to it. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that these considerations can drastically alter
the sincere preferences for assignment, especially in those chambers where one or a
few policy committees are in particularly high demand. Second, members without
enough experience in the chamber (b) might make mistakes about which committees
best serve their agenda. In this context, these members’ requests would diverge from
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their agendas due to lack of ability to map their priorities to committee jurisdictions.
Figure 5.1: Those Influences Working Against the Match
(b′)
(b)
(a)
(c)
(d)
There are also those influences that act on the leadership and can alter the trans-
lation of requests into assignments. Here, we again see the influence of member
legislative experience, but here it operates through the leadership’s knowledge about
individual members (b′). I expect for leaders to know more about members who
have been in the chamber longer and for this lessened uncertainty about capabilities
and goals to make leaders more likely to accommodate requests. Therefore, I expect
for newer members’ requests to be accommodated to a lesser degree. Additionally,
leaders face institutional constraints (c) when making assignments. The number of
committees and assignments can make it so that not all requests can be accommo-
dated, especially if demand is concentrated. This forces leaders to make decisions
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about who to accommodate and who not to.1 Institutional constraints also impact
the strategic request behavior of members, as the number of committees and assign-
ments impacts the probability of assignments and, thus, member expectations in this
regard. Finally, party (d) can also impact the tendency of leaders to accommodate.
Minority members should be less likely to be accommodated than majority members,
especially when majority leadership controls the process and the committees have
important powers in the legislative process.
After articulating the theoretical basis for the match, I turn to proposing a measure
in Chapter 2. Here, I argue that scholars can leverage large amounts of legislative
activity data to estimate individual agendas. If members are more active in areas
that are priorities to them, then using their activity can elucidate their priorities.
I, then, devise a means of comparing these “revealed agendas” to their committee
assignments in such a way that yields a continuous measure of committee-agenda
distance. I show that there is a significant amount of variation across and within
state legislative chambers on this variable. I, then, demonstrate that the measure as
I have devised it, is superior to two potential alternative. Relying on activity data,
it avoids the problem of strategic discounting that can arise if we relied on requests
to form agendas. Additionally, activity data is more broadly available and accessible
than the alternative.
In Chapter 3, I turn to a central premise of this project, demonstrating the im-
portance of the match in the legislative process. Specifically, I show that legislators
with better matches tend to be more effective and more capable of shepherding their
1It is true that leaders generally have significant leeway in designing the committee system. In
Chapter 1, however, I discuss the limits of institutional manipulation for the purposes of accommo-
dation.
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bills through the obstacles of the legislative process. Furthermore, the influence of the
match varies predictably by certain characteristics. Specifically, I find that majority
members benefit more from good matches than the minority members but that this
effect is only present in chambers with gatekeeping powers. The partisan effects of
the match only materializes when the potential for partisan control of the process
exists. Furthermore, this conditional effect was uncovered for various measures of
cumulative legislative effectiveness (see Table 3.5).
Once I demonstrated the importance of the committee-agenda match, I moved
on to describing its sources in Chapter 4. There, I argued that the main sources
of variation in the measure arise from individual member characteristics but that
the effects of those characteristics are dependent on important institutional features.
Specifically, I identify experience, party, and district diversity as those features that
primarily shape the match. These features play out differently in different chambers,
however. I find that experience (tenure) has the expected positive effect on the match
but that its effect is mostly found in states without term limits. States that do have
term limits appear to punish rookie members in terms of their match, but the degree
of punishment is quite variable, and there do not appear to be any effects at higher
levels of experience.
Minority party members also appear to be “punished” in terms of their match,
but, again, this effect is isolated to those chambers with gatekeeping. Furthermore, I
find support for a conditional party government hypothesis, in that the partisan ef-
fect seems to be much more pronounced when the majority is relatively homogeneous.
Therefore, we see the largest effects of party status in those states where the majority
is homogeneous and committees have negative agenda power. Finally, I demonstrate
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that members who emerge form districts with a diversity of interests and priorities
have a more difficult time matching their agendas with assignments than those from
more homogeneous districts. Members from diverse districts simply have more prior-
ities to consider when devising their preferred committees and are, thus, more likely
to miss out on an assignment crucial to their agenda. I did expect for the number
of assignments to mitigate the effect of diversity, but I found no evidence to support
this conclusion. It is possible that the number of committees required for this kind
of mitigation might vary significantly by chamber, which would obfuscate the effect
from emerging in the results of my analysis.
In all, this project has demonstrated the importance of considering the connec-
tion between a legislator’s committee assignments and their agenda. This connection
is the result of members devising committee requests based in their policy interests
and those of their constituents and the tendency of leadership to accommodate those
requests. When this occurs smoothly, we can expect better matches that should
advantage members in the legislative process. When this occurs less smoothly, as-
signments and agendas will be less well matched and legislators may be less prepared
to effectively engage in the process. I find that experience, party, and constituency all
impact the match as we would expect and that institutions matter for the translation
of individual resources into matched institutional positions.
5.1 The Value of Committee Assignments
Although I do not explicitly discuss the “value” of particular committee assignments,
this analysis does have several important implications for this line of research (e.g.,
142
Bullock and Sprague 1969; Bullock 1973; Munger 1988; Endersby and McCurdy
1996; Groseclose and Stewart 1998; Stewart and Groseclose 1999). Scholars in this
field have developed methodologies for ranking standing committees, typically using
committee transfer data. The most broadly used measure of committee value comes
from Groseclose and Steward (1998, 1999) and is referred to as the “Groswart” es-
timate. Unlike previous measures, which simply consider the ratio of transfers in to
total transfers (Bullock and Sprague 1968), or Munger’s (1988) more involved “net
transfer dominance,” the Groswart estimate weights transfers to committees by the
value of the committee transferred from, through a process of simultaneous maximum
likelihood estimation. In effect, those committees transferred to from popular com-
mittees have higher values than those transferred to from less popular committees.
Although Groseclose’s and Steward’s procedure reliably estimates the aggregate pop-
ularity of standing committees, to me this does not seem to be the same thing as a
committee’s value.
The value of a committee should be related to the benefits members can accrue
based on their assignment to it. The authors mentioned above all assume that any
particular committee will generate the same benefits for all or most members. While
the Groswart estimate is described as the average value of a committee assignment,
the potential hypotheses that they propose are all related to individual member’s
electoral fortunes or retirement decisions. Average values may be indicative of other
trends, but they should not be causally related to individual outcomes, especially
in those cases where the estimates are rather unstable or when prestige is not the
primary goal for members.
Because they are averages, if there is a lot of noise in the estimates, then they could
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be resulting from opposing trends among legislators. In these cases, the estimates
would be useless in predicting individual outcomes in a generalized sense because
the distance between the individual value of the assignment and the average is more
likely to be large. Figure 5.2 reproduces the estimates of U.S. House committee
assignment values from Groseclose and Stewart (1998, Table 2) but plots them with
their confidence intervals so that we can compare the estimates across committees.
Figure 5.2: Groswart Estimates fo Average Committee Value for U.S.
House Standing Committees: 81st-102nd Congress
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Source: The figure plots the estimate and 95% C.I. from Groseclose and Stewart
(1998), Table 2.
Note: The Groswart estimation procedure yields a value of infinity for the Ways
and Means committee, which is the top ranked committee and excluded from
this figure.
What we find is that the uncertainty in these estimates render large groups of them
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indistinguishable from each other. In reality, we cannot say with any certainty that
assignments to Judiciary, on average, are more valuable than those to Veterans Af-
fairs, for example, because their estimates are statistically the same. Furthermore,
with only the control committees do we see any significant differences from the ma-
jority of House standing committees, and, still, they are indistinguishable from each
other.2 In essence, the only conclusion we can draw from the Groswart estimates is
that the control committees are more valuable than the policy committees.
This result is thoroughly unsurprising given the out-sized role that the control
committees play in the legislative process in the U.S. House. It is also unsurprising
because of the prestige associated with these committees. While prestige might moti-
vate members of the U.S. House to want to transfer to control committees, the effects
of prestige should be much less pronounces for policy committees (Fenno 1973), where
policy goals should dominate. As mentioned in Chapter 1, prestige is the only goal
that is associated with universal aggregate preferences for assignment. Only when
a committee can elevate any legislator’s status should we expect for all members to
value that assignment equally. If the goal is re-election, or good public policy, then
the value of the particular assignment is dependent on the member’s policy priorities
or those of their constituents. Unlike with Congress, where certain policy committees
might have elevated visibility, in the states, the politics of committee assignments is
much less salient to voters. Assignments in the states are less likely to function as
competency cues like they do in Congress, simply because the public is less likely to
be exposed to the business of state legislative committees than national ones. Given
this context, prestige should be a much less common goal in the states than it is in
2The Groswart estimation procedure yields a value of infinity for the Ways and Means committee,
which is the top ranked committee and excluded from this figure.
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Congress.
The view of committees expressed in the preceding chapters emphasizes the sub-
jective nature of committee assignment by focusing on the match between agendas
and assignments. I argue that policy committees do not have objective value divorced
from the goals of legislators. In fact, the only way to truly evaluate the value of a
committee assignment is in relation to individual legislator agendas. If my view of
committees is to be believed, then the “Groswart” estimate, and any other estimates
that provides average values based on transfers, are actually estimates of the aggre-
gate agenda of the chamber’s membership and not measures of a characteristic of the
committees, themselves.
5.2 Present Shortcomings and Directions for Fu-
ture Research
Although this project has demonstrated the importance of the committee-agenda
match and outlined some of its sources, further investigation would benefit from a
larger and more inclusive sample of states. First, the sample did not include either
of the two states (Hawaii and Washington) that rely on the party caucus to assign
members to committees. This type of assignment authority could drastically change
the dynamics of accommodation if it significantly decentralized the assignment au-
thority. Additionally, the sample does not have good representation from the deep
south. The partisan dynamics in Southern states are well known to differ from those
in most others (Key 1950, 1984) and could lead to significant differences in the par-
tisan effects on the match. Finally, the limited time dimension to the data does not
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allow us to effectively test some interesting hypotheses about the change in the match
over time. Specifically, a longer time-series would allow us to better evaluate the ef-
fects of tenure on the match. Do legislators tend to improve their matches over time?
Additionally, a longer time series would give us the leverage required to consider the
effects of change in party control.
Future research on legislative committees should continue to capitalize on the
power of the states in conducting comparative American legislative analysis. The
variation in institutions and social, political, and economic contexts that we find in
the states allow us to test a great many hypotheses that are impossible or incredibly
problematic at the national-level. In terms of legislative committees and agendas,
there are peculiar arrangements in some states that allow for interesting case studies
or even natural experiments (e.g., Brookman and Butler 2015). Nebraska is perhaps
the most notable of states in this regard due to its unicameral, non-partisan legis-
lature. Scholars have already taken advantage of these peculiarities to evaluate the
effects of legislative parties (Wright and Schaffner, 2002) or the process of polariza-
tion (Masket and Shor, 2015) in non-partisan contexts. In terms of committees, these
peculiarities could better reveal the partisan dynamics of the match. Furthermore,
the unicameral nature of the Nebraska legislature might provide leverage on questions
of cross-chamber effects.
Another interesting possibility not available at the national-level is using multi-
member districts (MMDs) to separate out the personal from the constituency influ-
ences on committee assignments. Legislative scholars have long taken advantage of
the presence of MMDs in the states (e.g., Niemi, Hill and Groffman, 1985; Cox and
Morgenstern, 1995; Darcy, 1998; Larimer 2005) to test important theories about elec-
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toral politics and party representation. Multi-member districts provide us with the
opportunity to evaluate member behavior within and across constituencies. There-
fore, we should be able to compare the assignments of legislators from the same
district to ascertain the degree to which they are conforming to constituency priori-
ties. Because the subjective nature of the value of an assignment is rooted in personal
and constituency motivations, understanding the balance between these two should
further elucidate the nature of the match. Do we have delegates, who are primarily
motivated by constituency priorities, or trustees who are influenced by their own per-
sonal agendas? Furthermore, under what contexts should we expect to see these two
models of representation play out in the committee system?
Although we tend to think about some committee assignments as being “good”
for a legislator, while other might be “bad,” we should instead focus on the degree to
which their assignments match their priorities. This emphasizes the individual nature
of the value of assignments to policy committees and forces us to consider the specific
goals and motivations of legislators. In doing so, we find that members seek committee
assignments that provide them with visible influence within important issues areas,
in order to enact policy changes or protect those status quo policies that they or their
constituents prefer. Short of successful policy outcomes, members want to appear to
have influence within those areas most important to their constituents. These insights
propels us towards an understanding of committees as having subjective value that
depends entirely on the context within which the legislator finds herself. As such,
the true value of committees can be found in the match between assignments and
agendas.
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Appendix A
Measuring Legislative District
Diversity of Interests
In this Appendix, I propose a measure of interest diversity that can be calculated using
demographic Census data for a broad range of geographies and time periods. Because
I am focused on policy agendas, I include in the measure those demographics that
should be most commonly associated with particularized interests: Race/Ethnicity,
Language, Industry of Employment, Income Group, and Education Group. While the
specific type of diversity I am interested in here has to do with interests and priorities,
the procedure outlined below can be used for any variety of multidimensional con-
cepts of diversity. The measure uses data from The National Historical Geographic
Information System (NHGIS) at the University of Minnesota. NHGIS aggregates
large amounts of Census block data to specific geographies, including states, coun-
ties, congressional districts, and state legislative districts. While measures of diversity
already exist, those commonly in use in political science suffer from several problems.
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In the rest of this appendix, I will discuss the most common measures of diversity,
I will outline the procedure for producing the measure proposed here, and then I
will evaluate it in relation to other existing measures, paying particular those even
scenarios identified by Hill (Hill 1973).
A.1 Common Measures of Diversity
In this section I will introduce common measures of diversity found across several
different disciplines. A common issue with all of these measures is the relative scaling
and difficulty of interpretation. Furthermore, these problems can be become greater
if we try to incorporate multiple dimension of diversity into one measure.
The first measure I examine is the Simpson Index (1949), which calculates the
probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a population will be of the
same “type.”1 This calculation is the basis of the often used measure in comparative
politics, known as “ethno-linguistic fractionalization” (Easterly and Levine 1997).2
The Simpson Index is measured as follows:
λ =
s∑
i=1
p2i (A.1)
Where pi is the proportion of the population in category i, and s is the total number
of categories. This measure can range in value from 1/s to 1, where 1/s indicates
that all categories are equally represented in the population and 1 indicates that all
1In 1946, three years prior to Simpson’s introduction of his index, the economist Albert
Hirschman published a measure of trade concentration that took the form:
√∑s
i=1 p
2
i . There-
fore, while we might credit Hirschman with the development of this index or at least the intuition
behind it, the literature labels the measure the “Simpson Index.” Additionally, Hirschman (1964)
shows that this measures has also frequently and incorrectly be attributed to Gini.
2Ethno-linguistic fractionalization is the inverse (1− λ) of the Simpson Index.
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individuals belong to only one category. Frequently, scholars will take the inverse
of the Simpson Index in order to display the probability that two randomly drawn
individuals will be of different “types.”
The next measure of diversity is Shannon Entropy (Shannon 1948). This measure
emerges from information theory and summarizes the “entropy” of a community.
Like the Simpson Index, it assumes that rare occurrences carry more “information”
than common ones. However, unlike the Simpson Index which weights proportions
by themselves, Shannon Entropy assumes the “information” value of occurrences are
proportional to the logarithm of their proportional abundance.3 That average amount
of “information” is the entropy, which is calculated as follows:
H = −
s∑
i=1
pi log2(pi) (A.2)
Unlike the Simpson Index, Shannon Entropy does not have an intuitive interpretation,
the values are relative and simply indicate matters of degree.
The Coefficient of Variation is the next measure I consider. For continuous data,
it is simply the standard deviation of the mean divided by the mean. In the case of
nominal data, we can use the following formula provided by Kvalseth (1995):
CV = 1−
[
1−
(
s
s− 1 × (1− λ)
)] 12
(A.3)
Where λ is the Simpson Index. This measure can vary between zero and one and
is negatively and linearly related to the standard deviation so that as the distribu-
tion departs from uniform (where the coefficient equals one), the measure decreases
3The choice of logarithm depended on the researchers expectations regarding the information
carried by rare groups.
151
towards zero.
The final set of measures considered here are from Hill (1973) and are referred to
as “True Diversity” or “Hill Diversity Numbers.” This set of measures form the basis
of the multivariate measure proposed in this appendix. Unlike any of the previous
measures, True Diversity numbers can be interpreted as the “effective number” of
groups (Hill, 1973 431), which means as the number of groups were the groups of
equal size. The measure can range from zero to ∞ and is calculated as follows (Hill
1973; Jost 2006):
qD = (
s∑
i=1
pqi )
1/(1−q) (A.4)
Where the notation is the same as above, except that the value q is the “order” of
diversity, and determines the measure’s sensitivity to more or less relatively abun-
dant categories, where q > 0 favors more abundant categories, q < 0 favors the less
abundant categories and when q = 0 the relative abundances are ignored entirely and
the measure returns the number of categories. Common values of q are one and two,
which produce measures that favor larger groups and are closely related to Shannon
Entropy and the Simpson Index, respectively. In fact, minor transformation to these
two measures will yield diversity numbers, and are displayed in Table A.1.
The diversity number of order two should be familiar to many comparative politics
scholars as the same formula for Laasko’s and Taagepera’s (1979) “effective number
of parties” (ENP). Furthermore, we find that ENP is simply the reciprocal of the
Simpson Index, while diversity of order one is the exponential function of Shannon
Entropy.4 Beyond the ease of interpretation, these measures provide us with one addi-
4Diversity of order one is undefined, but Hill (1973) shows that 1D = limq→1(qD) =
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Table A.1: The Order of Hill Diversity Numbers: Descriptions and Formulas
Order (q) Description Formula
−∞D =
reciprocal of the proportional
abundance of the rarest category
= 1/ps
0D = total number of categories present = s
1D =
exponential function of Shannon
Entropya
= exp(−
s∑
i=1
pi log2(pi))
2D = reciprocal of the Simpson Index = 1/
s∑
i=1
p2i
∞D =
reciprocal of the proportional
abundance of the most common
category
= 1/p1
NOTE: Notation is the same as for equation A.4, except that the proportional abundances (pi)
are arranged in decreasing order from 1 to s. The table is mostly a reproduction from Hill (1973,
429).
tional crucial advantage; namely, they produce common sense values under conditions
of evenness.
A.2 Evenness and the Measuring of Diversity
Hill (1973) proposes a means of accessing a populations “evenness” from certain spe-
cific diversity measures. Measures of diversity, like Simpson, Shannon, or coefficients
of variation, will only produce maximal values when the proportional abundances are
equivalent, making it so that there is a even distribution across categories. Although
this is an unlikely scenario in real populations, these hypothetical contexts where
groups are evenly divided do provide us with insight concerning these measures.
exp(−∑si=1 pi log2(pi)), where −∑si=1 pi log2(pi) corresponds is Shannon’s (1948) measure of en-
tropy (H).
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Figure A.1: Evenness and Single Dimension Measures of Diversity:
The Inverse Simpson Indexa (1 − λ), Shannon Entropyb (H), and
True Diversityc (qD)
1-λ = 0,    H = 0,    qD = 1
1 Group
1-λ = .5,    H = .693,    qD = 2
2 Equivalent Groups
1-λ = .8,    H = 1.609,    qD = 5
5 Equivalent Groups
1-λ = .9,    H = 2.303,    qD = 10
10 Equivalent Groups
NOTE: In each scenario listed above, the population is split evenly into 1,
2, 5 and 10 mutually exclusive groups. When dealing with a single group or
any number of equally sized groups, the order does not change the resulting
measure. By construction, in these special cases, iD = jD for all real numbers
i and j.
aThe Inverse Simpson Index: Subtract Eq. A.1 from one.
bShannon Entropy: Eq. A.2
bTrue Diversity: Eq. A.4, where q = 2
Specifically, these scenarios provide us with contexts where we can easily identify
what a measure of diversity should convey. While unrealistic, the scenarios allow us
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to judge the validity of a measure because of the simplified nature of the context. In
Figure A.1, I present four scenarios where the population is divided into several even
groups and calculate three measures of diversity for each scenario. In this context,
where all groups are of equivalent size, the order of diversity does not change the
measure. True Diversity numbers of any order will always return the number of
groups when those groups are evenly distributed. What we find from the figure is
that, while all the measures increase as we increase the number of groups, only the
True Diversity number does so in a linear fashion.
What this means is that when we compare, for example, a population with five
even groups to one with ten even groups, we find that only the diversity numbers
yield the intuitive result that population two should be twice as diverse as population
one. While every measure does register an increase in diversity, Shannon Entropy
indicates that the second population is only 43% more diverse, while the Simpson
Index shows it as only 12.5% more diverse than the first population. Figure A.2
presents four measures of diversity for populations divided by even groups up to 200.
What we see from the figure is that the coefficient of variation is particularly
useless given that it does not differentiate among any of these scenarios. Although
Shannon Entropy does differ across scenarios, it does not approach the relative values
that we would intuitively expect. Similarly, the Inverse Simpson Index reaches .9
at ten even groups and only increase to .99 as the population is divided into 100
even groups. Therefore, Simpson, Shannon and the Coefficient of Variation all fail
to effectively distinguish among scenarios that we can intuitively assess as being very
different in terms of diversity. True Diversity, on the other hand, produces values in-
line with out expectations and consistent with general conceptions of diversity. Now
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Figure A.2: Measures of Diversity Across Hypothetical “Even”
Scenarios
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that I have demonstrate the advantages of True Diversity, I turn to procedures for
expanding these measures to the multiple dimensions of human diversity.
A.3 Expanding Diversity to Multiple Dimensions
While there may be instances when scholars are particularly concerned with some
single dimension of diversity, as is the case with the Effective Number of Parties
(Laasko and Taagepera 1979), in general, human diversity is a multidimensional con-
cept. We may be interested in cultural diversity that is made of race, language,
religion, etc. Or, as is the case for this project, diversity of political interests and
priorities, which could be composed of any demographic category that demonstrates
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significant connections to politics and political interests. While data on citizen policy
priorities would be preferable, representative samples at the state legislative-level are
non-existent and would be costly to collect. Therefore, I employ demographic data
to proxy the diversity of interests and priorities.
Lieberson (1969) presents us with one possibility for combining multiple variables
into a measure of diversity, which was seized on and expanded by Sullivan (1973).
The method is a simple, multi-variable version of the inverse Simpson Index:
A = 1− (
k∑
i=1
p2i /V ) (A.5)
Where k is the total number of categories across all variables and V is the number
of variables. The Sullivan Index can be interpreted as “the average proportion of
unshared characteristics” among “an infinite number of pairs... selected randomly
from a finite population (Sullivan, 1973, 70).” However, in standardizing by variables,
Sullivan isolates the average proportion of unshared characteristics across variables,
but, this value is not easily interpretable, especially if the population is diverse on
some characteristics but homogeneous on others. Additionally, Sullivan encounters
the problem discussed above, in that the combination of variables does nothing to
mitigate the concerns over proportional consistency across intuitive scenarios. In
fact, by increasing the number of total categories, Sullivan’s procedure emphasizes
this quality of the Simpson Index.5 Relying on True Diversity instead of the Simpson
Index corrects for this concern, while standardizing by categories yields a much more
easily interpretable measure.
I expand the measures of True Diversity to incorporate multiple variables, but
5see Figure A.2, where the ability to differentiate among scenarios becomes more difficult as the
number of categories increase.
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maintain its desirable characteristics of ease of interpretation and intuitive consis-
tency. While Sullivan (1973) standardizes the multivariate Simpson Index by the
number of variables, I propose to standardize a generalized multivariate measure of
True Diversity by the total number of categories across all variables:
qDV =
∑V
j=1
[
(
∑sj
i=1 p
q
ji)
1/(1−q)
]
∑V
j=1 sj
(A.6)
In Equation A.6, the portion between the bracket in the numerator is the generalize
equation for True Diversity of order q. Thus the procedure above calculated True
Diversity for each of the variables included, sums those values, and standardizes by
the total number of categories across all variables. The resulting measure will vary
from zero to one and represents the “effective proportion” of all categories defined
by the variables included. Therefore, if we include three variables, all with three
categories and our diversity value is equal to .75, then we know that the effective
number of groups or categories is equal to 6.75. In other words, of the nine total
groups in our three variables, the population includes the equivalent of 6.75 (75%)
equally sized groups. Therefore, a value of one on my measure indicates and even
distribution across all of the groups within the variables and for all the variables
included.
In addition to the problems with the Simpson Index, with real data, where there
may be significant diversity on some variables but not on others, the process of stan-
dardizing by variables can produce deceptive results. In Tables A.2 and A.3 I present
the most and least diverse state legislative districts in my sample, by the order of
diversity and the standardization method. All of the values to produce these ta-
158
bles were calculated using the True Diversity equation with q equal to one, two, and
three. For each value of q I show the most and least diverse districts based on the
method of standardization (category vs. variable) as well as the standardized True
Diversity for each variable independently. What this demonstrates is that the com-
bination method can significantly alter the ranking of districts. The last column in
these tables shows the average deviation on individual measures between the two
standardization methods. What that column reveals is that the average deviation
always favors the category method. The variable method identified districts with less
average per variable diversity than those identified by the category method.
Therefore, the measure I propose in this appendix takes advantage of the desirable
characteristics of True Diversity numbers (Hill 1973) and expands these to incorporate
multivariate concepts of human diversity. In doing so, I present a measure that can
reliable be computed for a large number of American geographies and can be adjusted
and fine-tuned to match the particular concept of diversity that scholars are interested
in.
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